Oliver Evans and the Framing of American Patent Law by Beauchamp, Christopher
Case Western Reserve Law Review Case Western Reserve Law Review 
Volume 71 Issue 2 Article 5 
2020 
Oliver Evans and the Framing of American Patent Law 
Christopher Beauchamp 





 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher Beauchamp, Oliver Evans and the Framing of American Patent Law, 71 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 
445 (2020) 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol71/iss2/5 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law 
Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
445 
Oliver Evans and the Framing of 
American Patent Law 
Christopher Beauchamp† 
Contents 
Introduction .................................................................................. 446 
I. Framing State and Federal Patents ......................................... 448 
A. Engines and Ingenuity ......................................................................... 448 
B. What Were State Patents? .................................................................. 452 
1. The granting process. ...................................................................... 456 
2. Purpose. .......................................................................................... 457 
3. Scope. .............................................................................................. 458 
4. Remedies. ........................................................................................ 459 
5. Cancellation and working requirement. ........................................... 459 
C. From State to Federal ......................................................................... 460 
II. Patronage, Property, and Politics .......................................... 463 
A. Inventor and Author ........................................................................... 464 
B. Justifying Patents: Right, Reward, and Relief .................................... 465 
III. Marshall, Jefferson, and the Property Question .................. 472 
A. Marshall and the Inchoate Right ......................................................... 473 
B. Jefferson and the Baltimore Millers .................................................... 476 
IV. Oliver Evans and the Making of American Patent Law ........ 482 
A. Litigation Machine .............................................................................. 482 
B. Oliver Evans and the Principles of Patent Law .................................. 485 
Conclusion ...................................................................................... 491 
 
 
†  Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This article has benefited greatly 
from the comments and suggestions of Lionel Bently, Oren Bracha, Anisha 
Dasgupta, Con Diaz, John Duffy, Richard Epstein, Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, 
Gerard Magliocca, Adam Mossoff, Michael Risch, Josh Sarnoff, Jeremy Sheff, 
Kara Swanson, and participants in the NYU Law School Classical Liberal 
Institute’s symposium on “The Rise of Intellectual Property in the Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Centuries,” of which this contribution forms a part. Special 
thanks are due to the editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review, 
including Rachel Lamparelli, Amy Rubenstein, Bridget McCusker, Jacqueline 
Kett, Reagan Joy, Zhaocheng Li, Sarah Schneider, and Matthew Casselberry, 
for their thoughtful and generous editing under the exceptionally difficult 
circumstances of 2020-2021.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Oliver Evans and the Framing of American Patent Law 
446 
Introduction 
Oliver Evans finally snapped one day in May of 1809. He had been 
a patent holder for more than twenty years, reaching back to the years 
before the U.S. Constitution and the first federal patent law. For Evans, 
these had been two decades of litigation, lobbying, and ceaseless 
struggle to promote himself and his flour-milling machines. Now came 
the final straw: a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, a past antagonist 
of Evans, delivering an opinion “highly damaging to the rights of 
inventors” mere days after having declared in court that a patent right 
was an “infringement of public right.”1  
Evans left his engineering works on Philadelphia’s Vine Street and 
went home. He gathered his family and brought out a thick bundle of 
papers: all the drawings, specifications, plans, and notes of inventions 
that he had not yet put into public use. It was for his family’s own 
good, he announced, that he must destroy his work, lest his children 
and grandchildren be led into ruin and persecution as he had been. All 
burst into tears, before unanimously signaling their assent, and Evans 
dumped his inventions into the fire.2 
In Evans’s telling, he was the victim of an American patent system 
that failed to protect inventors. Having been baited by the promise of 
protection, he was at times “thrown into despair” at being “robbed by 
law.”3 At one point he publicly renounced further inventive work, 
“forced to bury my talent with disgust,” as he put it, “because a patent 
in this country is not yet worth the expense of obtaining it.”4 Later 
historians sympathized, seeing Evans’s treatment by the courts as 
“unfair” handling in what they deemed the law’s “‘Embarrassing’ Era.”5 
 
1. There are several descriptions of this incident in Evans’s writings. The 
quoted language comes from Evans’s private notes made at the time and 
reproduced in Greville Bathe & Dorothy Bathe, Oliver Evans: A 
Chronicle of Early American Engineering 158 (1935). It is not clear 
which opinion of the court so distressed Evans. It may have been offered 
after the first argument in Evans v. Weiss, a case that Evans eventually won 
but in which the court had initially been “strongly inclined” against him. 
See id. (describing the opinion as “delivered but not made final”); Evans v. 
Weiss, 8 F. Cas. 888, 889 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 4,572) (“[T]he court at the 
last term, and upon the first argument, felt strongly inclined to give it the 
construction contended for by the defendant.”). 
2. Id.; Oliver Evans, On Useful Inventions, Nat’l Intelligencer, June 9, 
1817. 
3. Oliver Evans, The Young Mill-Wright and Miller’s Guide 373 (2d 
ed. 1807). 
4. Id. 
5. Frank D. Prager, Trends and Developments in American Patent Law from 
Jefferson to Clifford (1790–1870), part II, 6 Am. J. Legal Hist. 45, 48–49 
(1962). 
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To many of his contemporaries, though, Evans and his patent 
represented quite the opposite. He held a “monopoly” to which the 
millers and farmers of the country were “tributary” and which he 
deployed for “the oppression of individuals [and] the exaction of 
exorbitant sums of money.”6 Evans repeatedly sought and received the 
special favor of legislatures, both state and federal. Tellingly, when 
Evans publicly retold the story of burning his inventions in despair, he 
backdated it three years to 1806—before Congress renewed his most 
valuable patent, and before he built a system of licensing and litigation 
that spanned much of the country.7 
If the complicated birth of United States patent law can be told 
through the story of a single figure, that person is Oliver Evans. Evans 
was one of the leading inventors and engineers of the early Republic. 
He was also its most prominent patentee. Evans’s patenting activities 
spanned the Founding: he received patents from four states in the 
1780s, and then, after the United States Constitution authorized federal 
patents and Congress passed the first patent law in 1790, Evans 
obtained the third U.S. patent to be granted.8 His rights became the 
subject of sustained executive and congressional politicking, culm–
inating in his grant receiving the first legislative extension of a federal 
patent in 1808, three years after it had expired.9 The revived (and 
mightily controversial) patent then loomed over both the politics and 
the law of the patent system. Evans brought four of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s first six patent cases. And he pioneered large-scale patent 
enforcement in the early Republic, creating and directing a multi-state 
network of lawyers and agents to assert his rights, as well as issuing 
what must surely have been the first demand letter to a sitting U.S. 
President. Throughout, the articulate and frequently outraged Evans 
was the nation’s leading polemicist for the rights of patentees, damning 
the shortcomings of the law and the perfidy of his opponents in letters, 
pamphlets, and sarcastic verse. 
Even if Evans only served as a Zelig-like figure, repeatedly popping 
up at the major waypoints of Founding-era patent history, he would be 
 
6. Amendment Proposed to the Act Continuing Certain Patent 
Rights to Oliver Evans, S. Misc. Doc. No. 13-365, at 237–38 (2d 
Sess. 1814). 
7. Compare, e.g., Oliver Evans Memorial to Congress, reprinted in Oliver 
Evans, On Useful Inventions, Nat’l Intelligencer, June 9, 1817, at (“At 
the age of fifty-one years, despairing of ever receiving any reward from the 
public”), with Evans’s private account, reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra 
note 1, at 158 (“I was then in my 54th year”). 
8. See U.S. Patent Office, A List of Patents Granted by the United States from 
April 10, 1790, to December 31, 1836, with an Appendix Containing Reports 
on the Condition of the Patent-office in 1823, 1830, and 1931, 4 (Washington, 
D.C. 1872). 
9. An Act for the relief of Oliver Evans, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70, 70–71 (1808). 
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a crucial test case for several important historical questions, including 
the continuity or discontinuity between the pre-constitutional state and 
post-1790 federal regimes, the role played by natural-rights conceptions 
of the patent, and the enforceability of inventors’ rights in the early 
Republic. But Evans should stand for more than that. The history of 
patent law in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was 
not, by and large, driven by judicial abstractions or debates of political 
principle; instead, it was worked out in practice and shaped by the cases 
that came to the fore. And of the concrete contexts in which the patent 
right was hammered out, none were more Influential than the cases and 
controversies of Oliver Evans. 
I. Framing State and Federal Patents 
State patents have played little role in recent scrutiny of the 
Founding-era patent system. The search for precedent to the 
Constitution’s patent clause and to the first patent law more commonly 
leads to English antecedents.10 To some extent, this benign neglect is 
fair: state patents were a collection of ad hoc legislative grants rather 
than a general system of exclusive rights, and they lacked crucial 
features of the federal scheme adopted in 1790. But there was more 
continuity between the state and federal regimes than first meets the 
eye. 
Oliver Evans is an ideal candidate to test the connection. As the 
holder of four state patents, he enjoyed as much state protection as any 
inventor and more than most. And he bridged the constitutional divide: 
by obtaining a federal grant in 1790, Evans became the first inventor 
to traverse the two regimes. 
A. Engines and Ingenuity 
Oliver Evans was born in Newport, Delaware in 1755, the son of a 
shoemaker and farmer.11 He was apprenticed in his teens to a 
wheelwright and wagonmaker, and it was during this period that he 
began both his technical education and his restless mechanical 
tinkering. Evans later attributed his interest in steam engineering to a 
tale of a local blacksmith’s boy who filled a stopped-up gun barrel with 
water and heated the end to produce an explosion: at that moment, 
Evans recalled, “[i]t immediately occurred to me that there was a power 
 
10. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 
S. Ct. 1365 passim (2018). But—tipping my hand here—see Christopher 
Beauchamp, Repealing Patents, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 685 (2019) (arguing 
that American law consists of significant departures from English practice, 
not just continuation of English practice). 
11. See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 1–8 (discussing the details of Evans’s 
early life); Eugene S. Ferguson, Oliver Evans: Inventive Genius of 
the American Industrial Revolution 11–13 (1980). 
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capable of propelling any waggon [sic].”12 He later developed an interest 
in wire manufacturing and, while laid up from a scythe injury, designed 
a machine that would cut and bend the wire teeth used in carding wool 
and cotton.13 According to Evans, his short-lived efforts in that area 
attracted a mixture of ridicule from his family, a polite rebuff from the 
Pennsylvania legislature (which he had approached for a manufacturing 
subsidy), and swift copying of his demonstration prototype by the card 
manufacturers of Wilmington and Philadelphia.14 Having failed to gain 
an inventive foothold, by 1782 he was living at Tuckahoe, on the 
Eastern Shore of Maryland, and running a general store with his 
younger brother Joseph.15 
It was in Maryland that Evans conceived the first elements of the 
system for which he would become famous: the mechanized flour mill. 
Milling at that time was labor-intensive, hard, and unsanitary work, in 
which sacks of wheat were hauled to the top of the mill and progressed 
downward through a series of hand-operated processes and water-
powered grindstones.16 Starting in 1783, Evans began to piece together 
a series of machines that would collectively form a continuous 
automated milling process. The first was an elevator, a series of buckets 
on a moving belt that would lift the wheat in place of the traditional 
two-man hoist. The second was the “hopperboy”: a rotating rake that 
spread, cooled, and dried the ground meal on an upper floor of the mill 
while raking it into a hopper for bolting, or sifting. The hopperboy 
acquired its name because the job had hitherto been performed by a 
boy with a rake.17 
 
12. Elijah Galloway, History of the Steam Engine, From its First 
Invention to the Present Time 93–94 (London, Cowie & Co. 1826). 
13. See Patrick N.I. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression Exposed; or, 
Knavery Detected. In an Address, to Unite All Good People to 
Obtain a Repeal of the Patent Laws 20–21 (Philadelphia, 2d ed. 1814) 
[hereinafter Elisha, Patent Right Oppression] (written by Oliver Evans 
under pseudonym). 
14. Id. at 21–23. 
15. See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 9. 
16. See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 12; Ferguson, supra note 11, at 12. 
17. See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 11; Ferguson, supra note 11, at 
19–21. 
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It was not long before Evans put his designs into practice. He and 
two of his brothers had bought a portion of their father’s land near 
Newport in 1782, and now constructed a mill at a place called Red Clay 
Creek.18 The mill was operative by 1785. Once his system was in place, 
Evans tried to interest local millers, but with little success. The 
prosperous Quaker millers of Wilmington’s Brandywine Creek were 
uninterested, at least in paying Evans for the use of his invention.19 
Evans’s later accounts of this period recalled a mixture of clannish 
resistance, folksy skepticism (“Oliver, you cannot make water run up 
hill, neither can you make [hopper] boys without the help of women.”), 
and a calculating refusal to absorb the costs of experimentation.20 
Snubbed by the Brandywine millers, Evans turned to a different 
audience: the state. His friend George Latimer, a wealthy mill-owner’s 
son who had previously supported Evans’s carding-wire venture, was 
now a member of the Delaware Assembly. It was Latimer who suggested 
that Evans petition the state for an exclusive right to his inventions.21 
There was little local precedent: Delaware had never granted a colonial 
 
18. See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
19. Ferguson, supra note 11, at 24–25. 
20. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 156; see also Oliver 
Evans, Oliver Evans to His Counsel, Who are Engaged in Defence 
of His Patent Rights, for the Improvements he has Invented 9 
(n.p. 1817); Ferguson, supra note 11, at 22, 25. 
21. See Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 156–57. 
Evan’s flour mill 
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or state patent for an invention,22 though neighboring Pennsylvania and 
Maryland had both done so earlier in 1785, and the rival steamboat 
inventors James Rumsey and John Fitch were then noisily campaigning 
for state monopolies in the mid-Atlantic states.23 On the other hand, 
Latimer’s patronage offered Evans immediate traction with Delaware’s 
governing elite. George’s father, James Latimer, had been President of 
the convention that framed Delaware’s first state constitution; his 
brother Henry had recently been elected to the Continental Congress 
and would later serve in the U.S. Congress as Delaware’s representative 
and senator.24 
With George’s support, Evans petitioned for state protection in 
Delaware on January 16, 1786.25 Shortly afterward, he petitioned for 
exclusive rights in Maryland and in Pennsylvania, where again George 
Latimer lobbied the legislature on his behalf.26 Each state granted a 
legislative patent the following year: Pennsylvania in March 1787,27 
Maryland in May,28 and Delaware in November.29 Evans added a fourth 
 
22. See Bruce W. Bugbee, Genesis of American Patent and Copyright 
Law 73 (1967). 
23. See id. at 90, 95–97; Frank D. Prager, The Steamboat Pioneers Before the 
Founding Fathers, 37 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 486, 486 (1955). 
24. See 2 J. Thomas Scharf, History of Delaware 1609–1888, at 735 
(Philadelphia, L.J. Richards & Co. 1888). 
25. See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 15. 
26. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 25, 166. A member 
of the bi-state “Philadelawarean” elite, George Latimer would move to 
Philadelphia in the later 1780s and become speaker of the Pennsylvania 
House of Representatives in 1794–98. See John A. Munroe, The 
Philadelawareans: A Study in the Relations Between Philadelphia and 
Delaware in the Late Eighteenth Century, 69 Pa. Mag. of Hist. & 
Biography 128 (1945); George Latimer 1793–1798, Pa. House of 
Representatives: House Speaker Biographies, https://www.legis.state 
.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/SpeakerBios/SpeakerBio.cfm?id=104 [https://perma.cc 
/VVS2-JUYE] (last visited Dec. 12, 2020). 
27. An Act to Grant to Oliver Evans for a Term of Years the Sole and Exclusive 
Rights of Making and Selling within this Commonwealth the Machines 
Herein Described, in 12 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania 
from 1682 to 1801, at 483–85 (1906) [hereinafter Evans Pennsylvania 
Patent]. 
28. An Act to Grant to Oliver Evans, for a Term of Years, the Sole and 
Exclusive Right of Making and Selling within this State the Machines 
Herein Described, 1787 Md. Laws 215 [hereinafter Evans Maryland Patent]. 
29. An Act to Grant to Oliver Evans, for a Term of Years, the Sole and 
Exclusive Right of Making and Selling within this State the Machines 
Herein Described, 2 Del. Laws 915–17 (1787) [hereinafter Evans Delaware 
Patent]. 
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state grant when New Hampshire granted him exclusive rights in 
February 1789.30 
B. What Were State Patents? 
What were state patents for invention in 1786–1787? They were 
not generally called patents, for a start. The statutory grants of the 
pre-Constitutional period spoke in terms of “exclusive right” or 
“exclusive privilege;” the word “patent” appeared in state statute-books 
only in reference to grants of land.31 As exclusive privileges, rights to 
invention were not sharply distinguished from other state franchises, 
such as exclusive rights granted to the operators of ferries or stage 
carriages. Grants for inventions were part of a general impulse towards 
support of manufacturing and internal improvements in the new states, 
compounded by pressure to stoke domestic industry after postwar 
depression struck in 1784,32 and drawing support from skilled urban 
workingmen who formed an increasingly organized pro-manufacturing 
interest in the second half of the decade.33 State exclusive rights drew 
on a scattered tradition of colonial patents for inventions. But they 
remained notably ad hoc: with a range of approaches to term, 
specification, and remedies for infringement, there are few signs that 
the states were tracking practices or developments in the English patent 
law of the time.34 
We know little about practice under the state patents obtained in 
the 1780s, Evans’s patents among them. Historians have found no 
record of infringement litigation during the period, and evidence of 
financing, licensing, or assignment is scarce.35 The surviving evidence is 
limited to matters of form: the form of petitioning for exclusive rights  
30. An Act to Grant to Oliver Evans, for a Term of Years, the Sole and 
Exclusive Right of Making and Selling within this State the Machines 
Herein Described, in 5 Laws of New Hampshire 401–02 (Henry Harrison 
Metcalf ed., 1916) [hereinafter Evans New Hampshire Patent]. 
31. Search Results for the Word “Patent” in State Statutes, HeinOnline, 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Welcome (search in HeinOnline for “State 
Statutes: A Historical Archive” database; search “patent” within the 
database; then limit the date from 1780 to 1787). 
32. See Bugbee, supra note 22, at 84–85. 
33. See, e.g., Charles G. Steffen, The Mechanics of Baltimore: Workers 
and Politics in the Age of Revolution 1763–1812, at 81–82 (1984) 
(describing the emergence in Baltimore of a “‘mechanic interest’ that no 
politician could afford to ignore”). 
34. In one partial exception, state patents gravitated toward the English 
fourteen-year patent term. See Bugbee, supra note 22, at 88. 
35. One exception is an apparent profit-sharing agreement between James 
Rumsey and James McMechen over the former’s steamboat rights. See 
Letters of James Rumsey, Inventor of the Steamboat, 24 Wm. & Mary Q. 
Hist. Mag. 154, 168–69 (1916). 
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and the forms in which they were granted. Still, these forms are 
revealing. The language in which petitioners asked for protection and 
the terms in which legislatures answered reveal a good deal about their 
respective assumptions and purposes. 
Oliver Evans’s Delaware petition is a rare surviving petition for a 
state patent.36 Two things are striking about the document. First, the 
author did not expect the legislature to apply strict standards of either 
novelty or reduction to practice for his inventions. The petition 
described Evans’s machine for making card teeth as “perhaps entirely 
new.”37 When it came to Evans’s mill machinery, the petitioner des–
cribed himself as “altogether convinced that he can erect the following 
Machines (not yet extant).”38 
This prospectus-like language may have reflected Evans’s actual 
sense that his machines were not yet finished as of January 1786. Or it 
may have played to the second prominent feature of the petition: its 
insistence that Evans required an incentive to complete the invention. 
While the machines in question would “very much lessen the labour 
and consequently the expenses of the Milling Business,” Evans 
suggested, “the expense and labour attending the inventing, contriving, 
and erecting, the above mentioned Machines . . . would exceed any 
private emolument likely to be derived to himself, unless he had some 
exclusive right to make, and cause to be used, said machines[.]”39 Not 
for the last time, Evans argued that the grant of an exclusive right was 
a sine qua non, without which his pending inventive work would be 
withheld. 
Up to this point, Evans’s petitioning fits the prevailing historical 
view of state patents as developmental grants, concerned above all with 
creating incentives for the introduction of new technology. But the germ 
of another perspective began to emerge as Evans grew more confident 
in his machinery and his prospects. In January 1787, after a positive 
report on his milling inventions by a committee of the legislature, Evans 
wrote again to the General Assembly, this time asking that the bill’s 
proposed fifteen-year term of exclusivity be lengthened to twenty-five 
years.40 Again, he stressed his need for an up-front incentive to bring 
 
36. The petition is in the collections of the Delaware Historical Society and is 
reproduced in its entirety in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 15. 
37. Id. (emphasis added). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. See Letter from Oliver Evans to the Delaware General Assembly (Jan. 3, 
1787), reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 16. 
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his technology into use.41 But now Evans began publicly to identify 
himself as a distinctive figure—an inventor. “If Providence has endowed 
me with a Genius Capable of Invention Probably I may render my 
Country greater Services in this than any other line I can engage in,” 
he declared, adding that “Nature if attended to will Direct each of us 
to the Studies She has adapted us for.”42 A group of Evans’s customers 
added a letter of support in similar terms, predicting that Evans would 
improve on his machines based on “the Knowledge we have of Your 
Petitioners Ginius [sic].”43 
Oren Bracha has noted that the idea of the inventor of genius was 
promoted by patentees under the new federal patent laws of the 1790s 
and early 1800s.44 (The term “genius” was then a capacious term 
encompassing innate creative or intellectual capacity; it sometimes, 
though not always, carried the connotations of exceptional brilliance 
that the word has today). State patents for invention in the 1780s 
typically did not dwell on the status of inventors or on the idea of 
genius more generally. 
Another type of state-conferred right did, however. Most states 
adopted copyright statutes between 1783 and 1786 (Delaware was the 
one exception),45 and several of these statutes referred to the encour–
agement of “literature and genius.”46 Copyright brought with it a 
different set of assumptions about the basis of the grant: in particular, 
arguments that the protection of creative works secured the natural 
right of the creator in his creation. These assumptions were principally 
shaped by the British “literary property” debates of the 1760s and 
1770s, in which publishers had sought to push their protection beyond 
 
41. See id. (“I have concluded that it will not prove to my advantage to proceed 
further in these (hitherto) unprofitable Studies untill [sic] I obtain of different 
States an exclusive right . . . .”). 
42. Id. 
43. Letter from Caleb Byrnes, Joshua Stroud, James Stroud, Marshall & Stroud, 
and William Byrnes to the Delaware General Assembly (Jan. 24, 1787), 
reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 17. 
44. Oren Bracha, Geniuses and Owners: The Construction of Inventors and the 
Emergence of American Intellectual Property, in Transformations of 
American Law: Essays in Honor of Professor Morton J. Horwitz 
375–77 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
Bracha, Geniuses and Owners]. 
45. See Oren Bracha, United States Copyright, 1672–1909, in Research Hand–
book on the History of Copyright Law 340–41 (Isabella Alexander & 
H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui eds., 2016). 
46. See, e.g., Copyright Enactments of the United States 1783–1906, at 
5 (Thorvald Solberg comp., 2nd ed. 1906) (noting a 1783 Connecticut statute, 
a 1783 New Hampshire statute, and a 1786 Georgia statute all including in 
their name “An act for the encouragement of literature and genius”). 
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the scope of statutory copyright by arguing that the author’s natural 
right was protected at common law.47 Invoking protection for the fruits 
of one’s inventive genius in America in the middle 1780s would have 
hinted at a similar framing for inventors’ rights. 
Even so, the meshing of these natural-property ideas with exclusive 
rights for invention, already discernible in England in the 1770s and 
1780s,48 was tentative in the pre-Constitutional United States. The one 
state in which a patent made explicit reference to natural right and 
inventive genius was South Carolina,49 which was also the only state in 
which a patent-granting power appeared as part of the state’s copyright 
act.50 Elsewhere, as in Evans’s case, the proposition that inventors were 
a class laying special claim to their rights qua creators was an undertone 
for now. 
The states collectively granted some two dozen patents for 
inventions in the years before the Constitution, of which Evans received 
four.51 As private acts of the state legislatures, each state patent was a 
customized grant, with no two inventors’ rights being exactly alike. On 
one day in 1788, for example, South Carolina enacted two patents with 
different remedies for infringement, different conditions on the working 
or licensing of the inventions, and different disclosure requirements.52 
 
47. Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: The Intellectual Origins of 
American Intellectual Property 1790–1909, at 12, 238–39 (2016) 
[hereinafter Bracha, Owning Ideas] (noting that the American state 
copyright statutes were justified on the same grounds that English advocates 
used to press for common law copyright, and thus were the equivalent of the 
1710 Statute of Anne supported by the 1770s English rhetoric of literary 
property). 
48. See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual 
History, 1550–1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255, 1295–1300 (2001). 
49. See An Ordinance to Secure to Isaac Briggs and William Longstreet, for the 
Term of Fourteen Years, the Sole and Exclusive Privilege of Using a Newly 
Constructed Steam Engine Invented by Them, in 5 The Statutes at 
Large of South Carolina 71–72 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1839) [hereinafter 
Briggs & Longstreet Ordinance] (declaring in its preamble that “principles 
of natural equity and justice require that authors and inventors should be 
secured in receiving the profits that may arise from the sale or disposal of 
their respective writings and discoveries, and such security may encourage 
men of learning and genius to publish and put in practice such writings and 
discoveries as may do honor to their country and service to mankind”). 
50. See Bugbee, supra note 22, at 93. 
51. See Bugbee, supra note 22, at 84–103. 
52. Compare Briggs & Longstreet Ordinance, supra note 49, at 71–72 
(stipulating damages for infringement of double the value of every 
infringing engine, requiring the inventors to put their engine in practice 
within one year, and instructing them to record with the state an “accur–
ate account of the precise principles and construction” of the invention), 
with An Act to Invest in Samuel Knight, and his Assigns, the Exclusive 
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There was greater standardization for individual inventors across 
borders: Evans’s four state grants differed in some respects, but mostly 
shared the same language and terms. As such they tell a common story 
about how rights were conferred and configured. Given the relatively 
scant record of how state patenting worked in practice, it is worth 
distilling some of the details of Evans’s grants. 
1. The Granting Process. 
Evans’s patents were granted after some process for review and 
debate, and perhaps for opposition. In the case of Delaware, for which 
the most records of the process survive, Evans’s petition was reviewed 
by an appointed committee of the state legislature. The inventor 
appeared in person before this committee in January 1787 and, 
according to his principal biographers, “explained at great length and 
with much detail, the reason why he should be considered the original 
inventor of the machines he specified in his petition.”53 Similar 
legislative committees reviewed and reported on Evans’s petitions in 
Pennsylvania and Maryland.54 The criteria applied by these bodies are 
unknown, but Evans did not get everything he asked for. The Delaware 
Assembly disregarded most of the machines mentioned in his petition 
and granted exclusive rights only for the elevator and hopperboy.55 The 
Pennsylvania legislature rejected Evans’s card machines “because they 
had got into use” and his milling devices, other than the elevator and 
hopperboy, on grounds that the public had earlier use of similar 
machinery.56 
The states also showed a willingness to reject claims that seemed 
excessively speculative. In his Pennsylvania petition, Evans had 
included yet another invention: land carriages powered by steam. He 
later recalled that the Pennsylvania legislature believed his plan 
“visionary” (in a bad way)57 and “treated his memorial as if they 
thought him insane.”58 Undeterred, Evans re-petitioned the Delaware 
Assembly for a broadly-described “exclusive Right of Propelling all land 
 
Right of Constructing and Vending a Machine for the Pounding of Rice, 
for the Term Therein Mentioned, in 5 The Statutes at Large of 
South Carolina 69–70 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1839) (setting damages at 
fifty pounds sterling per infringement, imposing a compulsory license of 
five pounds on demand, and requiring deposit of “an exact plan or model” 
of the invention that would be open to public inspection). 
53. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 17. 
54. Id. at 15, 19. 
55. See Evans Delaware Patent, supra note 29, at 915. 
56. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 166.  
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 25. 
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Carriages by the Power of Steam.”59 This proposal passed the Assembly 
but foundered before Delaware’s upper chamber.60 Only in Maryland 
was the steam carriage included in his eventual patent.61 It may have 
helped that Evans provided a drawing of a model wheel to the Maryland 
legislature,62 but it probably mattered more that his steam invention 
was recommended by the Baltimore merchant Jesse Hollingsworth, a 
legislator and leader of that city’s formidable mechanics’ association.63 
2. Purpose. 
On their face, Evans’s granted patents stated a functional and 
pragmatic rationale. Each declared that his covered inventions “will 
greatly tend to simplify, and render cheap, the manufacture of flour, 
which is one of the principal staples of this state.”64 (Other than in the 
inclusion or exclusion of the steam carriage, the wording of Evans’s 
private acts was nearly identical, suggesting that the inventor largely 
directed their drafting). Evans received his exclusive rights “in order to 
make adequate compensation . . . for his ingenuity, trouble, and 
expence [sic].”65 For now, the compensatory language gave no hint of 
the arguments from natural right that Evans would later adopt, and 
instead answered the main theme of his petitions: that invention was a 
costly endeavor. 
Notably, the roles of novelty and geography in this quid pro quo 
were not always clear. Colonies had granted patents of importation to 
those who merely introduced technology from outside; states did too, 
and for a while there was debate over whether the federal regime would 
do so. Both Delaware and Pennsylvania allowed protection to the 
components of Evans’s petitions that had the strongest claim to novelty 
and denied the others. Evans made representations during the course 
of his petitioning about his original inventorship. But it was not clear, 
 
59. Petition from Oliver Evans to the Delaware Assembly (May 28, 1787), 
reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 19. Evans purported to have 
“in Various Experiments . . . Invented an entire New Plan of applying said 
Powers,” but would not bear the labor or expense of bringing his plan to 
completion “without hopes of Considerable profit.” Id. 
60. See Minutes of the Council of the Delaware State, From 1776 
to 1792, at 1071–72 (Delaware, James Kirk & Son printers, 1886). 
61. Evans Maryland Patent, supra note 28. 
62. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 16. 
63. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 25; Steffen, supra 
note 33, at 88. 
64. See, e.g., Evans Delaware Patent, supra note 29, at 915. The Pennsylvania 
act substituted “Commonwealth” for “state” and the New Hampshire act 
omitted the “staple” clause, but otherwise the language in each state was 
identical. See id.; Evans Pennsylvania Patent, supra note 27, at 483–84. 
65. Evans Delaware Patent, supra note 29, at 915–16. 
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for example, whether Pennsylvania rejected his carding and grain-
breaking machines because they had been used in Pennsylvania, or 
because they had been used at all.66 And only Maryland stated in its 
granting act that it was a defense to infringement if “it shall be proved 
that the said Oliver Evans was not the original inventor of the 
machines.”67 It is not a given that lack of novelty would have served as 
a defense elsewhere. 
3. Scope. 
Evans’s state grants had neither specifications nor claims in the 
modern sense. The concept of the written disclosure as core of the 
patent bargain had emerged most visibly in Britain during the 1770s, 
and a few American state patents beginning as early as 1780 had 
included a requirement to disclose details of the invention to the public 
“in order that no person may unknowingly offend and that all after the 
expiration of the term . . . may be enabled to prosecute the said 
manufactures to their own advantage.”68 But Evans’s grants contained 
only a single sentence describing all of the inventions covered. Instead, 
each state’s act declared it infringement to make or sell “any hopper-
boy or elevator upon the plan of the said Oliver Evans, and constructed 
as the said hopper-boy or elevator of the said Oliver Evans is, or in the 
form, similitude or likeness thereof.”69 
This emphasis on covering the broad principles of operation and 
mechanical equivalents was characteristic of state patents. Evans was 
actively attempting to persuade millers to adopt his machines, so the 
acts did not need to focus on compelling him to disclose the invention. 
And the ex ante written definition of the scope of rights seems not to 
have been a concern for most state patents. Perhaps, as Herbert 
Hovenkamp has suggested, this reflected their background among other 
state franchises, such as monopolies and corporate charters, which were 
more concerned with mobilizing the franchised activity than they were 
with defining the right.70 More likely, patents were simply not yet 
conceived primarily in textual terms: the material invention itself 
defined the scope of the right, as it would continue to do in some ways 
well into the nineteenth century. Mushy ideas of novelty also took the 
 
66. See Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 166.  
67. Evans Maryland Patent, supra note 28. 
68. An Act to Grant to Henry Guest an Exclusive Right for the Term of Five 
Years of Making Oil and Blubber from Materials of his own Discovery, in 
10 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at 131, 133 
(1906); Bugbee, supra note 22, at 87. 
69. Evans Delaware Patent, supra note 29, at 916. 
70. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent 
Law, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 263, 276–77 (2016). 
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pressure off needing to define the invention against the prior art. 
Whatever the reasons, the under-definition of Evans’s rights would later 
become a great theme of his legal career, and his federal patent would 
eventually be instrumental in working out the law of patent scope and 
construction. 
4. Remedies. 
The theory of remedies was unsettled in early American patent acts 
generally, with monetary recovery for infringement based variously on 
actual damages, on the price of selling or licensing the invention, on 
multiples of either of these measures, or on other sums entirely.71 The 
Evans patents followed the most common pattern among state grants, 
which was to use a fixed penalty set by the granting act.72 In Evans’s 
case this was £100 for a first act of infringement, rising to £150 for 
repeat offenders.73 To the extent this tells us anything about the state 
regime, this “liability rule” protection suggests a taste for easy 
administrability and state control of valuation, while still providing a 
penalty stiff enough to deter infringement. 
5. Cancellation and Working Requirement. 
Finally, the states reserved a power to cancel Evans’s rights in 
return for a large fixed payment, ranging from £1,000 in Delaware to 
£5,000 in Pennsylvania.74 This provision was not common in state 
patents but seems to have appeared where state legislatures thought 
the invention had a special potential value to the community. James 
Rumsey’s steamboat grants from Virginia and Pennsylvania had 
included cancellation clauses two years before Evans received his grants, 
although the prices set for Rumsey’s rights (£10,000 and £8,000) were 
considerably higher.75 New Hampshire further added another 
 
71. See, e.g., Briggs & Longstreet Ordinance, supra note 49. See generally 
Bugbee, supra note 22, at 91–100 (demonstrating differing damages for 
patent infringements); Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (“such 
damages as shall be assessed by a jury”); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 
Stat. 318, 322 (“[A] sum, that shall be at least equal to three times the 
price, for which the patentee has usually sold or licensed to other persons, 
the use of the said invention . . . .”); An Act to extend the privilege of 
obtaining patents for useful discoveries and inventions, to certain persons 
therein mentioned, and to enlarge and define the penalties for violating the 
rights of patentees, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (1800) [hereinafter Patent Act 
of 1800] (“a sum equal to three times the actual damages sustained.”). 
72. See, e.g., Evans Delaware Patent, supra note 29, at 916–17 (demonstrating 
the fixed penalties set by each act). 
73. See id. 
74. See id. at 916; Evans Pennsylvania Patent, supra note 27, at 484. 
75. See Bugbee, supra note 22, at 96–97. 
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reservation in favor of the public, this one also present in some of the 
state steamboat patents: what would now be called a “working require–
ment,” making Evans’s rights conditional on a builder of his machines 
residing in New Hampshire within a year of the grant and throughout 
its seven year term.76 
Evans had little opportunity to test his state patents. After 
receiving his mid-Atlantic grants, Oliver sent his brother Joseph Evans 
on a grand tour of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, 
promoting his machines and seeking adopters. Despite offering a free 
license to the first miller in each county to employ the system, Joseph 
had no takers.77 Though discouraged, Oliver continued to develop the 
automated flour mill, filling out his system with three more grain-
handling machines: the conveyer (a kind of Archimedes screw); the drill 
(a segmented belt used for horizontal movement); and the descender (a 
gravity-operated belt for downward transport).78 Finally, during 1789, 
Evans found a customer progressive enough to adopt his system and 
prominent enough to impress other millers. This was Jonathan Ellicott, 
then head of the Ellicott family of wealthy Quaker millers who operated 
large mills on the Patapsco River near Baltimore. “I have never been 
with so ingenious a family,” Evans wrote in his diary of his visit to the 
Ellicott mills.79 Ellicott apparently received his license gratis under the 
Maryland patent.80 It was among the last work that Evans’s state grants 
would do. The following year, Evans would replace them with a federal 
patent. 
C. From State to Federal 
The federal Patent Act of 1790 was different in many ways from 
the state grants of exclusive rights. In place of a legislative regime, the 
act established a board of cabinet-level officials—the Secretaries of 
State and War and the Attorney General—empowered to grant 
patents.81 It also standardized requirements of novelty and disclosure, 
set a maximum (and in practice, standard) term of fourteen years, and 
dictated remedies for infringement and a process for challenging invalid 
grants.82 For all the differences between state and federal regimes, 
though, the inputs were strikingly similar. When Oliver Evans became 
 
76. See Evans New Hampshire Patent, supra note 30, at 401. 
77. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 31–32. 
78. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 13–14; Ferguson, supra note 11, at 25–
26. 
79. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 23 n.30. 
80. Id. at 21. 
81. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110. 
82. See id. § 1–2, 4–5. 
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the first to cross the threshold from state to federal protection, he 
encountered a familiar process for obtaining the grant. Indeed, it was 
his and his examiners’ lack of adaptation to new forms or formalities 
that would later break his first federal patent. 
The common thread of state and early federal regimes was their 
basis in petitioning. While the United States in 1790 had set up a 
general patent law open to all applicants, it retained the character of 
petition-based, direct-access government in both its origins and 
working. Indeed, the patent system should be set in the context of a 
federal government that, from its beginning, functioned in large part 
through direct petitioning to Congress.83 Private bills; petitions for 
relief, pensions, and compensation; the grievances of local communities 
and their requests for infrastructural development and industrial 
policy—these were the stuff of much legislative life in the early 
Congresses. The 1790 patent law came about in large part because 
Congress was already being pelted with petitions for federal patents.84 
As the legislature worked to set up an infrastructure for addressing 
petitions in general, the Patent Act was a prominent example of how 
Congress began to channel the stream of requests into formal evaluation 
processes.85 
Evans began to seek federal protection in May of 1790, barely a 
month after the passage of the Patent Act.86 The documentary record 
of his first federal patent is, alas, almost nil. The Patent Office fire of 
1836 destroyed most records from before that date, leaving only 
scattered examples from which to reconstruct early practice. 
From such circumstantial and indirect evidence as we have, though, 
it seems that both Evans’s petition and issued patents may have been 
more akin to state forms than to later U.S. patents. Like his state grants 
 
83. See Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative 
State, 127 Yale L.J. 1538, 1565 (2018). 
84. See generally Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 and 1790, 
Relating to the First Patent and Copyright Laws, 22 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 
243 (1940) (documenting the many federal patent petitions Congress 
received in 1789–90); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the 
Progress of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Admin–
istration, 1790–1836, at 115–17 (1998). 
85. See McKinley, supra note 83, at 1565. 
86. Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 176. Acquiring a national right was by 
no means automatic: most holders of state exclusive rights did not receive 
federal patents, at least not for the same inventions, though the most 
prolific state patentees—Evans and the steamboat inventors John Fitch 
and James Rumsey—all did. At least three other state patentees later 
received federal rights for inventions distinct from their state grants: the 
clockmaker Robert Leslie of Philadelphia, the New Englander Benjamin 
Dearborn, and Henry Guest of New Jersey. 
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and other early federal petitions,87 Evans’s petition sought protection 
for multiple machines, in his case described collectively as an “improve–
ment in manufacturing wheat into flour.”88 How much detail the 
petition contained is not clear, but the few surviving petitions from this 
period were relatively brief and largely devoted to impressing on the 
board the value (rather than the novelty or technical details) of the 
invention.89 At least one of them, an unsuccessful petition by Evans 
himself for a steam-carriage patent in 1792, contained only a single 
paragraph of description.90 In any event, Evans was expected 
subsequently to appear in support of his flour-milling claim, as he had 
done before the state legislative committees. In June 1790, he appeared 
before the board and “was requested to prepare drawings of his 
machines and when ready to give information.”91 
The signed and sealed patents emerging from this process were no 
more informative. Surviving patents from the 1790 regime adopt a one-
paragraph format, naming the inventor and providing only a summary 
description.92 To be sure, the statute required that a patentee file an 
enabling specification with the Secretary of State at the time the patent 
was granted, and the board eventually began to insist that 
“specification[s], . . . drafts or models” form part of the application.93 
But in Evans’s case, those formalities seem to have broken down. 
Historical accounts have sometimes assumed that the patent received 
by Evans in January 179194—the third federal patent issued—was the 
same as that allowed to him by Act of Congress in 1808, the so-called 
“Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans”95 that granted him a new fourteen-
 
87. Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 176–77. 
88. The register of petitions records Evans’s subject matter as “an improvement 
in manufacturing wheat into flour, called ‘the art of elevating wheat and 
meal from the lower to the upper stories, and of conveying it from any one 
part to another of the mill, and of spreading the meal to cool, and gathering 
it again, and of attending the boulting hopper, all without the aid of manual 
labor.’” Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 176. 
89. See Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 47, at 196–98. 
90. See Petition from Oliver Evans to the Patent Board, [ca. 1 Dec. 1792], 
reprinted in 24 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 683–84 (John 
Catanzariti ed., 1990). 
91. Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 179. 
92. Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 181–82. 
93. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110–11; Walterscheid, supra 
note 84, at 180–81. 
94. The patent was granted on December 18, 1790 but received by Evans only 
on January 7, 1791. P.J. Federico, The Patent Trials of Oliver Evans: Part 
I, 27 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 586, 589–90 (1945). 
95. Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70, 70–71 (1808). 
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year term three years after his first expired. But that assumption seems 
unsafe.96 
The best evidence we have of Evans’s documentary patent record 
may be a judicial decision that was not rendered until after the 1790 
patent expired.97 It depicts a rather slapdash process. The petition and 
specification did not match up with the issued patent, which included 
“the elevators, and other parts of the mill machinery, except, that the 
use of the hopperboy is incidentally mentioned; without any description 
of its use, and the manner in which it is to work.”98 Worse still, the 
only mention of the hopperboy in the patent was interlined, as though 
added after the fact. And the patent itself had not been recorded, 
despite delivery to Evans.99 Looking back even from the first decade of 
the nineteenth century, Evans’s federal grant seemed inadequate and 
irregular—a patent of the ancien regime. 
II. Patronage, Property, and Politics 
The acquisition of a federal patent was Evans’s first contact with 
Thomas Jefferson, who as Secretary of State and a member of the 
patent board oversaw his successful petition and signed his patent.100 
Within a year, Evans was building a mill for the patent’s other 
signatory, President George Washington.101 Proximity to federal gov–
ernment patronage was the recurring theme of Evans’s life as a 
patentee, for both better and worse. 
During the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Evans’s 
milling patent was before Congress, the courts, and the public more 
than any other. Along with Evans’s self-appointed role as the advocate 
of inventors, this meant that discussion of patents in the political sphere 
revolved substantially around Oliver Evans and his works. Evans and 
his opponents generated a stream of assertions about the nature of 
patent rights, cycling through different theories of desert, property, and 
social utility as they did so. 
 
96. Pursuant to the Act, Evans submitted a new petition for a patent to the 
Secretary of State in conformity with the Patent Act of 1793, attaching a 
fresh specification at that time and not simply incorporating by reference 
his 1790 grant. See id. at 70. (authorizing a patent “to be made out in the 
manner prescribed by” the later Patent Act); Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. 
454, 508–09 (1818). 
97. See Evans v. Chambers, 8 F. Cas. 837 (C.C.D. Pa. 1807) (No. 4,555). 
98. Id. at 838. 
99. See id. at 837. 
100. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 25. 
101. See id. at 25–27. 
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A. Inventor and Author 
There was truth to Evans’s later claims that his initial patent term 
did not reward him. For Evans, the 1790s were a struggle to promote 
his mill inventions. The early 1800s saw his technology gain momentum, 
only for enforcement of the patent to fail. 
For all that he was later criticized as a monopolist, Evans was a 
frantic disseminator of his invention. He claimed years afterward that 
he and his agents had travelled “thousands” of miles promoting his mill 
machinery.102 Their efforts were not entirely futile. By one estimate, 
more than a hundred mills had adopted his machines by 1792.103 Even 
so, the opposition of the Brandywine millers delayed uptake by others 
and was a subject of bitter resentment by the inventor.104 
Evans’s response was to scale up promotion by another route: the 
publication of a book outlining his inventions alongside some basic 
principles of mill engineering. This work, The Young Mill-Wright and 
Miller’s Guide, would far outlive Evans and his patents. First published 
in 1795, it continued to appear in subsequent editions until 1860, and 
was long considered a standard engineering reference work.105 It is worth 
appreciating that Evans was able to publicize the design of his invention 
aggressively because he possessed a patent for it: freed from the need 
to hold his know-how close, he made the book the centerpiece of a 
proselytizing strategy.106 But this was not an immediately rewarding 
path. Evans the author was consumed by his writing in the mid-1790s, 
to the exclusion of other business. The book grew uncontrollably in 
density and detail, gradually reducing Evans to such financial precarity 
that his wife Sarah had to sell the cloth she had spun for their children’s 
clothing in order to buy bread.107 An appeal to the Pennsylvania 
legislature for a subsidy (Evans had relocated to Philadelphia in 1792) 
was in vain, and only rescue by a wealthy benefactor allowed the book 
to reach publication.108 
After these thin years, Evans’s prospects began to improve. His 
patent licensing operation was extensive enough that his agents used a 
 
102. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 34–34. 
103. See Ferguson, supra note 11, at 29. 
104. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 34–35. 
105. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 47. 
106. See Oliver Evans, Address of the Advocate of the Patentees, 
Inventors of Useful Improvements in the Arts and Sciences 12 
(Washington City, Duane & Son 1806) [hereinafter Evans, Useful 
Improvements].  
107. See Evans, supra note 20, at 16. 
108. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 45–47. 
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standard printed form to record licenses.109 Although he often 
complained that revenues barely covered the cost of collection, Evans 
eventually made “small clear proceeds” on his milling patent, which he 
ploughed back into his work in steam engineering.110 
It was not lost on the perpetually disappointed Evans that his rights 
started to turn a profit just as his patent term approached its end. As 
its fourteen-year term expired, Evans adopted two strategies to prolong 
the reward. One was litigation. Evans did not engage in much if any 
infringement litigation during the 1790s.111 But beginning in 1804, 
Evans initiated a wave of suits in the U.S. Circuit Court (then a trial 
court) in Philadelphia: the first against Benjamin Chambers, a miller 
from Western Pennsylvania, followed by at least eleven more in 1805.112 
The Chambers case would not be decided until 1807, at which point it 
would both kill off the Evans patent and inadvertently cause it to rise, 
phoenix-like, from the flames. In the meantime, Evans pursued a second 
goal: the extension of the patent by Congress. 
Evans now entered the phase of his public career that was 
dominated by patent lobbying. As an inventor and businessman, his 
concerns were focused on steam engineering, and he thought of the 
revenues from the milling patent principally as a source of funding for 
his steam experiments. It was in these terms that he first attempted to 
interest Congress in a patent extension. Over the next two years, 
though, as his frustration with Congress grew, Evans developed a range 
of arguments for his own interest and that of inventors and patentees 
generally. 
B. Justifying Patents: Right, Reward, and Relief 
Histories of the early American patent system tend to describe the 
available theories of the patent during this period in a binary way. 
Patents were either utilitarian tools granted to encourage invention, or 
they were based on the natural right of the inventor to the fruits of his 
labor. Most accounts are comfortable saying that these conceptions of 
the patent were complementary and coexistent, which is true. But the 
arguments of Evans and others show a greater diversity of 
justifications—some of which resist or escape the binary framing—and 
the ways in which they were addressed to different audiences. 
 
109. Id. at 160 app. plate 31. 
110. Evans, Useful Improvements, supra note 106, at 12. 
111. The grounds and fate of an isolated 1795 suit filed against James Sterret, 
a mill owner from Erie County, are not known. See National Archives, 
Law and Appellate Records of the U.S. Circuit Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, 1790–1847, Microfilm Publication M969 (listing 
among the archived case files Oliver Evans v. James Sterret et al., October 
Term 1795). 
112. Id. 
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Roughly speaking, there were four frames for justifying the 
inventor’s right. One was a purely incentive-based or consequentialist 
argument, in which the purpose and benefits of the patent system were 
expressed solely in terms of mobilizing inventive efforts for the ends of 
social welfare. The text of the 1790 Patent Act provided perhaps the 
sparest statement of these ends: the Act’s one substantive charge to the 
eminences of the patent board was to grant a patent “if they shall deem 
the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important.”113 
An alternative (though not necessarily mutually exclusive) framing 
took the form of arguments from “natural justice” or “mental property,” 
which adopted the theory from common law copyright and the literary 
property debates that the creator possessed a natural property right in 
the fruits of his mental labor. These ideas too were present at the 
creation, with South Carolina’s state patent law, the only general 
patent provision enacted by a state before the Constitution, recognizing 
the natural justice of the inventor’s cause, and some early advocates for 
patentees in the 1790s advancing arguments from mental property.114 
In between these two perspectives were two other justifications for 
granting or strengthening the patent privilege. One was a compensatory 
or reward theory, in which inventors were to be rewarded after the fact 
for their costs and efforts, based on their service to the public. This was 
not a purely utility-maximizing argument directed to the generation of 
further inventions (or the “promotion of progress in the useful arts”), 
in that it focused intensely on the desert of the inventor—the private 
reward rather than the public good. At the same time, it was not 
inherently an argument from natural right or mental property, since it 
was entirely compatible with the grant being a discretionary one; not 
an entitlement but something more like a bounty, a gratuity, or a debt. 
This was the tenor of most of the pre-1790 state patents: Oliver Evans’s 
grants, after all, spoke of “adequate compensation . . . for his ingenuity, 
trouble and expense,”115 and the same concept continued into the first 
federal regime. 
The compensatory view of patents may seem, to us, strangely 
retrospective. The modern incentive theory of patents sees the social 
benefit of patent protection as prospective and dynamic: people will 
incur the costs of time and money necessary for invention because they 
expect to be able to appropriate a return on the invention. From 
society’s point of view, granting an exclusive right to inventions already 
made is simply the cost of doing business—a means to the end of future 
innovation, rather than a social obligation to the past inventor per se. 
 
113. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110. 
114. Bracha, Geniuses and Owners, supra note 44, at 375–77. 
115. See, e.g., Evans Pennsylvania Patent, supra note 27, at 484; see also supra 
notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
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By contrast, the compensatory view of Evans’s time focused very much 
on what the inventor was owed by the community. In doing so, it fit 
more than one logic of the early Republic. First, it carried the note of 
duty or obligation in what was still fundamentally an honor culture.116 
Pennsylvania state patents had described the grant in exactly those 
terms, calling it “consistent with the honor of this state to reward the 
inventors of useful improvements.”117 Second, it fit the governing 
institutions of a polity that compensated many providers of public 
services on a bounty basis.118 Naval officers and privateers took prizes 
and received bounties for capture; law officers were paid for arrests. 
Pensions for service in the Revolutionary War were a central topic of 
federal petitioning in the early Republic.119 After-the-fact compensation 
for efforts mobilized to the public good was a basic and pragmatic tool 
of American government well into the nineteenth century. 
The final frame, of which Oliver Evans became the supreme 
practitioner, was the argument for relief. In this view, inventors were 
an oppressed, victimized, and downtrodden class crying out for public 
aid. Again, this appeal fit a core category of governmental activity in 
the early Republic. Congress granted debt relief and tax remission, aid 
to those affected by natural disasters, and relief to the victims of 
maladministration.120 The constant stream of petitions to Congress for 
 
116. See, e.g., Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics 
in the New Republic, at xxi–xxii (2001) (discussing motivations of early 
American politics through an honor culture framework). 
117. An Act [for] Granting unto George Wall, Junior, the Sole and Exclusive 
Privilege of Making and Vending a Mathematical Instrument by Him 
Invented for the Term of Twenty-One Years, in 12 The Statutes at 
Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at 495 (1906); see also An 
Act to Grant to Arthur Donaldson, His Executors, Administrators and 
Assigns, the Exclusive Right of Making and Using in the River Delaware a 
Machine Called Hippopotamos by Him Invented, for the Cleansing of Docks 
and Raising Sand, Gravel, Dirt and Other Things from the Bed of the River, 
in 12 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, 
at 411–12 (1906) (“And whereas it is consistent with the honor of this state 
to reward the inventors of useful machines and the most rational and just 
mode of such reward is and ought to be the exclusive advantage resulting 
from the invention for a term of years[.]”).  
118. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Against the Profit Motive: The Salary 
Revolution in American Government, 1780–1940, at 3 (2013) 
(“[B]ounties, ever since the Middle Ages, had held great promise as 
instruments to vindicate the directives of the sovereign . . . .”) (describing 
the nineteenth-century transition of American government from profit-
seeking to salaried officers). 
119. Id. at 1, 145–46. 
120. See Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State: Disaster 
Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State, 17–18 
(2013); Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Consti–
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relief via private acts had lists of signatories ranging from one to 
thousands.121 As with each of the other justifications for support of 
inventors’ rights, the relief argument blended easily with other prin–
ciples. The wrong done to inventors, for example, might be the 
misappropriation of their mental property (a natural rights emphasis), 
or it might be their monetary loss on their experimental efforts (a 
compensatory rationale). All the same, the relief framing represented a 
distinct type of claim on government. 
Evans’s first petition to Congress for an extension of the milling 
patent was thoroughly prospective and consequentialist. According to 
the report of the House Committee to which it was referred, Evans 
sought an extension “with a view that he may appropriate the proceeds 
towards completing his further inventions on steam engines.”122 The 
committee considered that “if he could be encouraged to persevere, it 
is highly probable his discoveries may be rendered useful to his country, 
and at the same time profitable, and honorable to himself.”123 Evans 
was optimistic about his extension, and wrote to Thomas Jefferson, now 
President, to affirm that an additional term would support his “expen–
sive experiments in persuit [sic] of other useful improvements.”124 The 
committee’s report recommended drafting legislation to allow patent 
and copyright extensions generally,125 but Congress did not pursue the 
idea. 
Evans petitioned again a year later, in December 1805, and this 
petition was again coldly transactional.126 In dispassionately relating the 
limited returns under his 1790 patent, Evans noted that “he has already 
expended more than the nett [sic] profits arising from his invention” in 
spending $3,700 on steam engine research.127 After gesturing towards 
his “sanguine expectations” of labor savings worth 100,000 men, Evans 
gave an itemized budget for spending the anticipated returns on an 
extended patent term: $3,000 each for introducing steam engines, for 
further experiments, and for publishing a “Young Steam Engineer’s 
 
tution: The Lost One Hundred Years of American Administrative 
Law 122 (2012). 
121. See McKinley, supra note 83, at 1562 n.106 (citing 8 Documentary 
History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of 
America, 4 March 1789–3 March 1791, at xix–xx (Kenneth R. Bowling 
et al. eds., 1998)). 
122. Oliver Evans, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 8-128, at 1002–03 (2d Sess. 1805). 
123. Id. 
124. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 160 app. plate 31. 
125. Oliver Evans, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 8-128, at 1002–03 (2d Sess. 1805). 
126. Application of Oliver Evans for an Extension of his Patent, H.R. 
Misc. Doc. No. 9-196 (1st Sess. 1805). 
127. Id. 
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Guide.”128 He concluded with the explicit quid pro quo: “your petitioner, 
on his part, promises faithfully to exert his abilities to bring to 
perfection and into use his said improvements.”129 Again, Congress 
failed to act. 
When Evans returned to his cause for a third time late in 1806, his 
tone and his arguments were very different. He now came not for 
himself alone, but in concert with other inventors and patentees who 
had petitioned Congress for longer patent terms. Now his arguments 
were addressed more sharply to the needs of inventors as a class. On 
December 13, Evans wrote to President Jefferson that he was making 
his “last effort to draw the attention of the legislature . . . to the 
oppressed and aggrieved state of the men of inventive genius of this 
country who are generally made so poor by their pursuits,” and whose 
patents were so short-lived that they left inventors “in poverty and 
distress.”130 Reminding the President “that genius produces science and 
art, science and art produce agriculture, manufactures and commerce,” 
Evans described his advocacy for inventors in overheated terms: “not 
only the wealth and power of the nation but the happiness of millions 
yet unborn yes the very existence of millions depend on my success or 
on the measures to be adopted by Congress.”131 
One week later, Evans appeared before a congressional committee 
empaneled to consider the patent term. He presented himself on behalf 
of “the patentees, inventors of useful improvements, who have 
petitioned Congress for redress of grievances . . . in defence of mental 
property.”132 In this vivid speech, quickly published for wider circ–
ulation, Evans declared that: 
 Men of genius, in this country, are of all others least protected; 
they are slighted, embarrassed, and abused . . . . 
. . . [W]e are at the mercy of the rest of the community—an 
enslaved, oppressed, dependant [sic] class, amidst a free, 
enlightened, and independant [sic] people; held dependant on the 
will of the legislature of the nation, for the privilege of enjoying 
exclusively the fruits of our own labors . . . .133 
In a departure of both style and substance from his past 
congressional pleas, Evans now embraced the natural-right conception  
128. Id. 
129. Id.  
130. Letter from Oliver Evans to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 13, 1806), reprinted 
in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 127. 
131. Id. 
132. Evans, Useful Improvements, supra note 106, at 3. 
133. Id. at 4. 
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of an inventor’s mental property. He insisted “[t]hat men of genius are 
as justly entitled to protection . . . of the fruits of the labors of the 
mind . . . as any are in the possession of real or personal property.”134 
His central objective in making this argument was—as it had been for 
the proponents of common law copyright in Britain’s literary property 
debates—to argue for a perpetual term. Taking rhetorical aim at the 
framers of the Constitution, Evans demanded to know “What sort of 
right is this, which is entitled to be secured for a limited time only? . . . 
[W]hy not delegate to Congress the power to secure the right forever, 
to this, as well as any other property?”135 If not a perpetual right, he 
suggested, then three generations or at least a fifty-year term would 
serve.136 Finally, Evans built to a mighty climax on the benefits of 
perpetual patents to the nation. From the inventor thus secured, 
others catch the sacred flame, and engage in the same pursuit, 
with like success—genius, no longer held in contempt, is 
esteemed . . . persecution, abuse and robbery cease, because 
means of defence [sic] appear . . . . 
 The tide of genius flowing over our happy country, turning 
dry and barren wastes into fruitful fields, and enlivened by the 
cheering sun, refreshing rains, and gentle zephyrs of possession 
and enjoyment of rights, would bring forth flowers and fruits of 
useful discoveries and improvements in science and the arts, in 
abundance, which are now locked in embryo, by the cold north 
winds of disappointment, poverty, and despair.137 
As before, Evans’s lobbying fell on deaf ears. It may not have 
consoled him that a patentee interest began to emerge and organize in 
his wake. In 1807, Benjamin Dearborn, a fellow state-turned-federal 
patentee, founded the Newengland Association of Inventors and 
Patrons of Useful Arts, which during its short existence similarly 
extolled the inventor of genius.138 
By that time, though, Evans was grappling with one more setback 
of his own. The belated test case on Evans’s patent, Evans v. Chambers, 
finally came to a head in 1807.139 At argument in the U.S. Circuit Court 
 
134. Id. at 16. 
135. Id. at 9. 
136. See id. at 10. 
137. Id. at 14–15. 
138. See, e.g., Remarks on the Rights of Inventors, and the Influence 
of Their Studies in Promoting the Enjoyments of Life, and Public 
Prosperity (Boston, E. Lincoln 1807) (discussing the burdens of inventors 
and their unfair treatment under the law and in society). 
139. 8 F. Cas. 837 (C.C.D. Pa. 1807) (No. 4,555). 
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in Philadelphia, Evans suffered a nasty reversal of fortune before 
Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington and District Judge 
Richard Peters. Defendant’s counsel challenged the validity of the 1790 
patent based on formalities—among other things, the failure of the 
patent document itself to include the hopperboy recited in the 
petition.140 Evans’s counsel protested vehemently in open court, but 
privately advised Evans that they should find a way to stall the case 
lest the judges invalidate the grant.141 
Evans immediately wrote to Thomas Jefferson in distress, fretting 
that invalidity would subject him to suit from all the licensees from 
whom he had taken money, “which would [lead] to my utter ruin.”142 
The President wrote back to assure him that if the “high officers” of 
the patent board—of which Jefferson had been one at the time—had 
failed to ensure the patent complied with the statute, “their negligence 
cannot invalidate the inventor’s right who has been guilty of no 
fault.”143 But it was too late: Justice Washington deemed the objection 
“not to be gotten over.”144 
Ironically, Washington’s nullification of the expired patent accom–
plished what all Evans’s lobbying could not: a legislative restoration of 
the grant. With support from Jefferson, and with a letter from Secretary 
of State James Madison “stating his unwillingness to accept the decision 
of the Circuit Court,”145 Evans petitioned Congress once more. The 
resulting “Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans” allowed Evans to seek, 
and the Secretary of State to grant, a patent for his invention for an 
additional fourteen-year term beginning in 1808.146 Now Evans held a 
patent that was good until 1822, and he would test the patent law as 
it had not been tested before. 
 
140. Id. at 838. 
141. See Letter from Oliver Evans to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 18, 1807) (on file 
with National Archives), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Jefferson/99-01-02-5472 [https://perma.cc/P3Z4-LL5S] (“Mr [sic] Rawle 
advised me as a prudent step to consent that he should propose the 
opposite counsel to withdraw a Juror and let the cause lay over untill [sic] 
the next term stating that he was apprehensive that the court would 
decide against the validity of the patent . . . .”). 
142. Id. 
143. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 2, 1807) (on file with 
National Archives), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/ 
99-01-02-5538 [https://perma.cc/7K7Z-JRLA]. 
144. Chambers, 8 F. Cas. at 838. 
145. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 132. 
146. Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70 (Jan. 21, 1808). 
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III. Marshall, Jefferson, and the Property Question 
In October of 1808, a merchant named John Moody called at 
Jefferson’s Virginia plantations. Jefferson was away in the capital and 
the current occupants of his mill could give Moody no information, so 
Moody wrote the first patent demand letter to a sitting President of 
the United States.147 As agent of Oliver Evans, he explained, he had 
been employed “to Settle his Business with The Millars. Respecting 
thier useing his Improovements for Manufacturg flour without a 
Licence.”148 Jefferson could rightly consider himself a benefactor of 
Evans, having signed the act to extend Evans’s patent nine months 
earlier. What’s more, Jefferson did not believe himself liable, because 
his mill had been built after the original patent expired in 1804 and 
before the 1808 renewal. But if the President’s feathers were ruffled, he 
did not show it. Jefferson agreed to pay the requested license fee 
“willingly as a voluntary tribute to a person whose talents are 
constantly employed in endeavors to be useful to mankind, and not as 
a legal obligation.”149 
Far from ending Evans’s political struggles, the extension of his 
patent heightened the stakes and the controversy surrounding his 
rights. First, Evans announced his intention to increase license fees 
dramatically.150 This act aroused the collective ire of the millers, 
creating a powerful lobby against the patent. Second, Congress’s 
resurrection of the expired patent raised a thorny question about all the 
millowners who, like Jefferson, had adopted Evans’s system after the 
end of his original term. The act had included a proviso explicitly 
barring liability for any person “who shall have used the said 
improvements, or have erected the same for use, before the issuing of 
the said [second] patent.”151 But did that merely cover activity in the 
 
147. Letter from John Moody to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 20, 1808) (on file with 
National Archives).  
148. Id. 
149. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Moody (Oct. 26, 1808) (on file with 
National Archives), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/ 
99-01-02-8907 [https://perma.cc/VFK4-N3WK]. 
150. Letter from Oliver Evans for all the Newspapers in the United States (Apr. 
20, 1810), reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 167–68; see also 
Evans, Oliver Evans to His Counsel, supra note 20, at 30–32 (discussing 
the value of licensing his patents). 
151. Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70, 71 (Jan. 21, 1808) 
(“Provided, That no person who may have heretofore paid the said Oliver 
Evans for license to use his said improvements shall be obliged to renew 
said license, or be subject to damages for not renewing the same: And 
provided also, That no person who shall have used the said improvements, 
or have erected the same for use, before the issuing of the said patent, shall 
be liable to damages therefor.”). 
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gap between the first and second terms, or did it permanently exempt 
all mills built during that period? 
These two sources of vexation in turn produced a split between 
Founding Fathers over the nature of property in invention. In the 
courts, Chief Justice John Marshall rendered the principal judicial 
opinion now cited as support for a propertarian conception of patents 
in the early Republic.152 At the same time, in the public sphere, former 
President Thomas Jefferson penned what is now the most famous 
pronouncement against the natural-property vision of patents: his 1813 
letter to the Baltimore miller Isaac McPherson.153 Neither is quite what 
it seems. 
A. Marshall and the Inchoate Right 
What was the nature of an inventor’s right in his invention? Did it 
depend on the existence of a patent, or did it precede the grant of legal 
exclusivity? How did it relate to the rights of the public? All these 
questions were forced to the forefront by the unusual circumstances of 
Evans’s renewed patent. Many alleged infringers had (or claimed they 
had) set up their mills in the period between his first and second grants. 
When sued, these defendants argued that the Act for the Relief of 
Oliver Evans was an unconstitutional ex post facto law, exposing them 
to liability on investments made before its passage.154 Evans’s lawyers 
responded that what really mattered was not the date of the patent, 
but the date of invention: the inventor’s rights, while perfected and 
given the protection of positive law by the patent of 1808, nevertheless 
stemmed from his act of invention itself, and thus preceded the 
defendant’s activities, even for mills set up before the patent.155 It was 
a short hop from that argument to a contention that inventors in 
general possessed a pre-patent right. 
The first part of this move is demonstrated by Evans v. Weiss, the 
first case applying Evans’s rights to a mill built before the 1808 
 
152. Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564). See Adam 
Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? 
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 Cornell L. 
Rev. 953, 995 (2007) [hereinafter Mossoff, Who Cares]; Oil States Energy 
Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1384 (2018). 
153. See Mossoff, Who Cares, supra note 152, at 960–67 (relating the elevation 
of Jefferson’s letter by scholars and the courts); Jeremy N. Sheff, Jefferson’s 
Taper, 73 SMU L. Rev. 299, 301 (2020) (referring to the letter as “part of 
the fundamental lore of American intellectual property (IP) law”). 
154. See, e.g., Jordan, 8 F. Cas. at 873 (reporting suit from Evans after defen–
dants begin manufacturing machinery covered by Evans’s expired patent 
before he had received the extension); Evans v. Weiss, 8 F. Cas. 888, 889 
(C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 4,572) (bringing suit after defendants produced 
Evan’s machinery during a time where the patent was expired). 
155. Weiss, 8 F. Cas. at 889. 
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patent.156 Justice Bushrod Washington, presiding in the Circuit Court 
in Philadelphia, rejected the ex post facto argument “because the 
general [patent] law declares, beforehand, that the right to the patent 
belongs to him who is the first inventor, even before the patent is 
granted.”157 Any person who constructed a machine invented by another 
thus assumed the risk that the earlier inventor would obtain a patent 
and “cut him out of the use of the machine thus erected.”158 
Washington’s opinion was, in essence, a restatement of the first-to-
invent patent regime: that the first inventor, and only he, had the right 
to obtain a patent on the device in question. 
Chief Justice John Marshall expanded on the point in Evans v. 
Jordan, decided in the U.S. Circuit Court of Virginia in June 1813.159 
Describing the first inventor’s exclusive right to obtain a patent, 
Marshall proclaimed: 
The constitution and law, taken together, give to the inventor, 
from the moment of invention, an inchoate property therein, 
which is completed by suing out a patent. This inchoate right is 
exclusive. It can be invaded or impaired by no person. No person 
can, without the consent of the inventor, acquire a property in 
the invention. Whenever, then, previous to a patent, any person 
constructs a machine discovered by another, he constructs it 
subject to the right of that other.160 
Marshall proceeded to explain why this prevented him from 
construing the Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans as an ex post facto 
law. Like any first inventor, Evans had gained an “inchoate and 
indefeasible property in the thing discovered [which] commences with 
the discovery itself, and is only perfected by the patent.”161 Thus 
Congress in granting that patent was not retroactively invading “sacred 
rights of property”—meaning the property rights of those who had built 
the machine before the grant.162 The statute’s proviso protected only 
activities taking place before the grant of the renewed patent, and the 
“plain meaning” of the act did not need to be twisted to give mills built 




158. Id. at 889–90. 
159. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. at 872. 
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It is important to note that, when Marshall wrote of the inventor’s 
“inchoate and indefeasible property,” he did not associate it with Oliver 
Evans’s oft-made claim that the patent protected an inventor’s natural 
right in his labor. The property outlined by Marshall was a right of 
priority, exclusively capable of ripening into a patent—it arose with the 
invention, but did so by virtue of first possession, not genius; it derived 
from “the constitution and law,” not natural right.164 
The other little-known feature of Marshall’s opinion in Evans v. 
Jordan is that half the court disagreed. The U.S. Circuit Court was a 
two-judge affair, with Marshall sitting alongside U.S. District Judge St. 
George Tucker.165 Tucker, the author/editor of the leading American 
legal treatise (Tucker’s edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries), was 
scarcely less of an authority than Marshall.166 He wrote no published 
dissent in Evans v. Jordan, but certified the division of opinion—
sending the case by right to the U.S. Supreme Court167—and prepared 
a memorandum opinion that survives in Marshall’s papers.168 
Tucker saw the matter not in terms of the inventor’s pre-patent 
property, but of the public’s post-patent right. “In Conference with 
Judge Marshall,” he wrote:  
I made the following Observations to him.  
 The Objects of the C[onstitution of the] U[nited] S[tates] & of 
the Patent Laws, is two fold.  
 1. To secure to Inventors, &c the Benefit of their Inventions.  
 2. To procure for the Citizens of the U:S: the full Knowledge, 
and Benefit of those Inventions after the Expiration of the period 
for which the patent is granted. 
 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 872. 
166. See Davison M. Douglas, Foreword: The Legacy of St. George Tucker, 47 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1111, 1112 (2006) (“Tucker was the most significant 
legal scholar of the early nineteenth century, particularly after publication 
of his five-volume edition of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England in 1803.”). 
167. See Jonathan R. Nash & Michael G. Collins, The Certificate of Division 
and the Early Supreme Court, 94 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3532666 
[https://perma.cc/6UBJ-TQ7N]. 
168. Memorandum from St. George Tucker on Evans v. Jordan and Morehead, 
(c. June 7, 1813), in The Papers of John Marshall Digital Edition 
(Charles Hobson ed.), https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ 
default.xqy?keys=JNML-chron-1810-1813-06-07-2 
[https://perma.cc/H3L2-4WTC]. 
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 . . . . 
 . . . The moment it expired the second Object of the Law 
became a matter of Right, to every Citizen of the U:States.169  
In Tucker’s view, allowing Evans’s patent to operate against 
machines built before 1808 “would have the effect of an Ex post facto 
Law . . . And, to punish a Man for exercising a Right legally acquired, 
would be a Violation of common Right, which is also contrary to the 
Spirit of the C[onstitution of the] U[nited] States.”170 
B. Jefferson and the Baltimore Millers 
Even as judges took divergent positions on the balance between 
private property and public right, the opponents of Evans’s patent were 
making their case in the political realm. By far the most powerful and 
organized group resisting Evans were the millers of Baltimore, led by 
the wealthy Quaker families, the Tysons and the Ellicotts.171 After 
losing a test case against the renewed patent,172 the Baltimore millers 
became the inventor’s principal antagonists in Congress and in the 
press. By the beginning of 1813, they were petitioning Congress to 
reconsider its decision “to let Mr. Evans loose upon the community with 
so grievous, so despotic a power.”173 
The greatest coup scored by the Baltimore millers was the enlist–
ment of Thomas Jefferson to their cause. In August 1813, one of their 
number, Isaac McPherson, wrote to Jefferson in search of prior art in 
the library of Monticello: “I am told that thou hast in thy possession a 
Book of an old date that has the plates of the screw and elevator at 
work in a mill . . . .”174 Jefferson responded with a lengthy letter 
assailing Evans’s patent on several fronts. Like Judge Tucker had done 
in Evans v. Jordan two months earlier,175 Jefferson sympathized with 
the accused infringers’ ex post facto argument. The renewal act, he 
thought, was intended to exempt those who built mills before the 




171. Evans v. Robinson, 8 F. Cas. 886, 886 (C.C.D. Md. 1813) (No. 4,571). 
172. Id. at 886–88.  
173. Memorial of William Cole and others to Congress (Jan. 1, 1813), reprinted in 
Application to Amend the Act Continuing Certain Patent Rights 
to Oliver Evans, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 13-354, at 224–25 (2d Sess. 1814). 
174. Letter from Isaac McPherson to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 3, 1813), in 6 The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 353–54 (J. Jefferson Looney et al. eds., 
2009). 
175. See Memorandum from St. George Tucker, supra note 168.  
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especially given the retroactive alternative “being contrary to natural 
right.”176 
Furthermore, Jefferson continued, Evans’s pretended inventions 
were not new. Here Jefferson unleashed his library in full, citing earlier 
uses of the bucket elevator and screw conveyer in a long list of classical 
and modern texts.177 He conceded only that the “Hopper-boy is an [sic] 
useful machine; &, as far as I know, original.”178 
Famously, Jefferson then elaborated on the question of patent 
property. He rejected the claim “by some (and in England especially) 
that inventors have a natural and exclusive right to their inventions.”179 
This contention was by now the stock-in-trade of Evans’s lobbying for 
his own patent extensions and the rights of inventors generally.180 
Echoing arguments familiar from the eighteenth-century British literary 
property debates,181 Jefferson pointed to the disconnect between a 
natural property right and the fugitive and nonrivalrous nature of 
information: 
 
176. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 379 (J. Jefferson Looney et al. eds., 
2009). To be clear, Jefferson made this argument as a matter of statutory 
construction, not constitutionality: it was settled law by this time that the 
Ex Post Facto clause applied only to criminal law. See Calder v. Bull, 3 
U.S. 386, 391–93 (1798). With the apparent exception of Judge Tucker, 
courts reviewing the Evans Act saw no reason to disturb that premise. See, 
e.g., Evans v. Robinson, 8 F. Cas. at 888 (“[T]he act referred to is not an 
ex post facto law, for that relates to criminal cases only . . . .”).  
177. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 176, at 380–
82. 
178. Id. at 382.  
179. Id. It is not entirely clear to which English commentators Jefferson was 
referring. But with the War of 1812 ongoing, English ideas were presumably 
in bad odor. 
180. See, e.g., Evans, Useful Improvements, supra note 106, at 6, 9 (“[T]he 
United States, was convinced of the good policy of rewarding men for 
making useful discoveries . . . by securing for limited times, to authors and 
inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”); 
Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 147 (“A patent is 
a protection of an inherent right for a limited time . . . .”). 
181. See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303, 2363 (K.B.) (Yates, J., 
dissenting) (“But how can an author, after publishing his work, confine it 
to himself? If he had kept the manuscript from publication, he might have 
excluded all the world from participating with him, or knowing the 
sentiments it contained: but by publishing the work, the whole was laid 
open; every sentiment in it made public, for ever; and the author can never 
recall them to himself, never more confine them to himself, and keep them 
subject to his own dominion. . . . So, from the time of publication, the ideas 
become incapable of being any longer a subject of property: all mankind are 
equally intitled [sic] to read them; and every reader becomes as fully 
possessed of all the ideas, as the author himself ever was.”). 
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[I]t would be curious then if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of 
an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in 
exclusive and stable property. [I]f nature has made any one thing 
less susceptible, than all others, of exclusive property, it is the 
action of the thinking power called an Idea; which an individual 
may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the 
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every 
one, and the reciever [sic] cannot dispossess himself of it . . . . [H]e 
who recieves an idea from me, recieves instruction himself, 
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, 
recieves light without darkening me . . . . [I]nventions then 
cannot in nature be a subject of property. [S]ociety may give an 
exclusive right to the profits arising from them as an 
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce 
utility.182 
As Jeremy Sheff has argued, it would be a mistake (albeit an oft-
made one) to see Jefferson’s letter as a declaration that consequen–
tialism alone underlay early American thinking about patents.183 
Jefferson’s ideas about creation and ownership remained embedded in 
a worldview that privileged natural rights.184 This much is evident in 
Jefferson’s treatment of the Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans: he did 
not criticize it on grounds of utility—say, because it gave an 
unnecessary windfall to an inventor or constrained the development of 
the industry—but insisted that it should be treated as a law “abridging 
the natural rights of the citizen,” in keeping with Americans’ near-
universal “sentiment that ex post facto laws are against natural 
right.”185 Like Judge Tucker in Evans v. Jordan, Jefferson saw the 
limited-time patent bargain as vesting rights in both the inventor and 
the public. And as with Evans’s own fluid switching between welfarist 
and natural-rights arguments in pursuit of greater protection, 
Jefferson’s letter to McPherson shows that the two frames were not 
mutually exclusive. 
Jefferson’s letter soon became the centerpiece of the Baltimore 
millers’ ongoing attempts to repeal or modify Evans’s act.186 Their 
 
182. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 176, at 383. 
183. See Sheff, supra note 153, at 303–06. 
184. Id. at 305–06, 313 (arguing that Jefferson drew the metaphor of the taper 
from Cicero and that his views were accordingly grounded in a classical 
natural rights tradition). 
185. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 176, at 
379. 
186. See Memorial to Congress of Sundry Citizens Praying Relief from the 
Oppressive Operation of Oliver Evans’ Patent, Niles’ Wkly. Reg., Feb. 
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efforts made some headway in Congress. A Senate committee chaired 
by Maryland’s Samuel Smith, a former mayor of Baltimore, reported in 
favor of a bill to amend the act, endorsing the millers’ arguments that 
Evans’s inventions were not new at the time of his original patent and 
that Evans had “abused the power vested in him” by the renewal.187 
But a House committee led by Representative Charles Ingersoll of 
Philadelphia—Evans’s own base of operations—rejected the millers’ 
memorial, observing that “[t]he patentee, by law, has an exclusive 
privilege to use his invention as he pleases. No person has a right to 
complain if the proprietor of an invention demands a sum deemed 
exorbitant, more than if such a demand had been made for any other 
species of property.”188 
For his part, Oliver Evans responded to the clash of 1813–14 by 
rising to his polemical peak. In the press, his pamphlet-length response 
to Jefferson’s letter was entitled “A Trip Made by a Small Man in a 
Wrestle with a Very Great Man.”189 Jefferson, he argued, had the 
argument from natural law precisely backward: no private property in 
land or animals existed in the state of nature without an act of 
appropriation and possession, “[b]ut a man’s ideas and inventions, are, 
by natural law, his own exclusive property; he need show no act to vest 
the property in him so long as he keeps them secret to himself.”190 Most 
of the tract was devoted to score-settling with various millers and 
telling his own sympathetic story, but Evans returned to his broader 
arguments about the patent system, recapitulating his theme of the 
suffering inventor and proposing that Congress adopt a twenty-eight-
year patent term.191 
Meanwhile, Evans pressed his own case again directly to Congress. 
“[I]n behalf of himself and the patentees in the United States” he 
pleaded for the relief of the oppressed class of inventors, “so few in 
number, that they are never represented in legislation,” and subject “to 
 
28, 1814 (Addenda to Vol. V), at 1 (enclosing as exhibit No. I the letter 
from Jefferson). 
187. Amendment Proposed to the Act Continuing Certain Patent 
Rights to Oliver Evans, S. Doc. No. 13-365, at 238 (2d Sess. 1814). 
188. Application to Amend the Act Continuing Certain Patent Rights 
to Oliver Evans, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 13-354, at 224 (2d Sess. 1814). 
189. Oliver Evans, Letter to the Editor, A Trip Made by a Small Man in a Wrestle 
with a Very Great Man, Niles’ Wkly. Reg., Feb. 28, 1814 (Second 
Addenda to Vol. V), at 1 (1814). 
190. Id. at 1. 
191. Id. at 12. 
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the frauds and jeers of knaves and wags, to deprivations and poverty.”192 
Again the appeal to property as a guidestar was a principal theme. Any 
man who discovered a piece of “unlocated land” could seek a land 
patent, “and on paying the public for their right to the soil, it is secured 
to him, his heirs and assigns forever.”193 Furthermore, the landowner 
could invest in improving his land, “building mills, furnaces, forges, 
bridges, roads, canals, &c. for their own and the public benefit,” all of 
which would be impossible if his term of ownership were only fourteen 
years.194 Compared to a patentee of “easily found” land, an inventor 
was more deserving—but “we have heard no good reason assigned why 
protection to them should be extended to 14 years only, while all other 
classes are protected in the exclusive right to the fruits of their labor 
forever.”195 
As usual, Evans’s arguments were not solely addressed to the 
inventor’s private benefit. This time, he seized on current events and 
interwove his property analogies with a quite different proposition: a 
fiscal case designed to appeal to Congress at a time when the War of 
1812 strained the federal government’s resources and had forced the 
adoption of new direct taxes.196 Evans fleshed out the idea in a further 
memorial to Congress, claiming rather optimistically that a 
combination of extended patent terms and royalties paid to the 
government would soon generate an explosion of invention and revenues 
“sufficient to free the people from taxation.”197 
The remaining piece in Evans’s literary output of 1813–14 was one 
of the more extraordinary publications about the early-nineteenth-
century patent system. On its face, Patent Right Oppression Exposed; 
Or, Knavery Detected was a vicious attack on Evans: it was subtitled 
“In An Address, to Unite All Good People to Obtain a Repeal of the 
Patent Laws” and dedicated “to the right, the honest millers 
throughout the United States.”198 In fact, the book was a work of epic 
sarcasm. Its centerpiece was an eighty-page poem, attributed to 
“Patrick N. I. Elisha, Esq., Poet Laureate,” a pseudonym swiping at 
 
192. Letter from Oliver Evans to the Honorable the Senators, and the 
Representatives in Congress, individually (Jan. 7, 1814), reprinted in Niles’ 
Wkly. Reg., Feb. 28, 1814 (Second Addenda to Vol. V), at 14 (1814). 
193. Id. at 14. 
194. Id. at 14. 
195. Id. at 15. 
196. Id. at 15. 
197. Letter from Oliver Evans to the Congres [sic] of the United States, each 
honorable member individually (Feb. 5, 1814), reprinted in Nat’l 
Intelligencer, Feb. 22, 1814, at 2095.  
198. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at A2. 
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the millers’ ringleader, Elisha Tyson.199 For page after page, the supp–
osed poet complained about “the law of patent-right / Whose nature is 
to make friends fight,”200 and damned Oliver Evans as an “avaricious, 
crazy-pated prig”201 and “the most selfish varlet, / That e’er was born 
of any harlot.”202 Meanwhile Evans’s own voice spoke from the 
footnotes, acidly pointing out the errors of the millers, telling the story 
of his own life and inventions, and rehashing his successful infringement 
litigation.203 After a wild climax to the poem, in which Evans was 
depicted (by himself, remember) as a devilish imp cavorting with Satan, 
scantily-clad witches, and assorted hags who “show’d their shankies as 
they rompt,”204 the volume turned into a collection of Evans’s petitions, 
publications, and autobiographical sketches. 
In addition to compiling many of the political and polemical 
arguments described above, these documents included an essay in which 
Evans did something few had attempted at that point: describe the 
principles of U.S. patent law.205 American patent jurisprudence was still 
unformed. As of 1813, only a handful of patent cases had been reported 
(though more had been litigated), only one of them by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.206 The first American patent treatise, published in 1810 by the 
New England lawyer and writer Thomas Green Fessenden, was based 
mostly on English cases.207 Evans, while admitting that he was not 
learned in law, prepared his Reflections on the Patent Law as “useful 
information to inventors and patentees.”208 He wrote of the nature of 
novelty under the Patent Act,209 of the scope of patents for “original 
discoveries” and follow-on inventions,210 and of the definition of prior 
 
199. Id. at unpaginated front material. 
200. Id. at 4. 
201. Id. at A2. 
202. Id. at 17. 
203. Id. at 2–9.  
204. Id. at 78–81. 
205. Reflections on the Patent Law, in Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, 
supra note 13, at 132, 132–48. 
206. See Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 362 & nn.26–30 (finding six reported 
patent decisions before 1810); Tyler v. Tuel, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 324 (1810). 
On unreported litigation, see Beauchamp, supra note 10, at 670. 
207. Thomas G. Fessenden, An Essay on the Law of Patents for New 
Inventions 42 (Boston, D. Mallory & Co. 1810). 
208. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 148. 
209. Id. at 136–40. 
210. Id. at 140. 
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art211—all subjects in which he had a rooting interest, but at the same 
time all genuinely fluid questions in early American patent law. 
This would be a front on which Evans fought for the remainder of 
his life. Having gained and regained his rights through the executive 
and Congress, he now had to define and defend his patent in the courts 
just as they labored to work out the details of the law. 
IV. Oliver Evans and the Making of                          
American Patent Law 
It is hard to overstate the scale, by early-nineteenth-century 
standards, of Evans’s patent enforcement efforts in the 1810s. In an age 
when law and business were both intensely local, small-scale affairs, 
Evans had lawyers and agents on commission going county by county, 
mill by mill in multiple states, documenting use of his patented 
invention, charging license fees, and filing infringement suits. At a time 
when there were few suits in federal court at all and only a smattering 
of patent cases, Evans brought so many that he had to create a form 
complaint for his attorneys and instruct them not by private 
correspondence but by printed circular.212 
The courts were forced to work through some basic conceptions and 
doctrines of patent law both in and by Evans’s cases. Judges wrestled 
with practical issues of as-yet-unformed patent doctrine, including how 
strictly to apply the requirements of validity and how to understand 
the scope of Evans’s rights at a time before patents contained formal 
claims. These problems also implicated the law’s contested relationship 
to English patent jurisprudence and practice. Oliver Evans did not 
make the law to his liking—indeed, he died bitterly angry about how 
he had been treated by the courts, three years before the Supreme Court 
finally invalidated his rights213—but it was partly through his inventions 
that American patent law took shape. 
A. Litigation Machine 
Evans’s patent assertion campaign rested on relentless enforcement. 
His agents in the 1810s were each instructed “to travel through a part 
of the United States, and to visit every flour mill.”214 In the summer of 
1814, for example, Evans’s brother Joseph traversed five New York 
 
211. Id. at 141–44. 
212. See Federico, supra note 94, at 673. See generally, Evans, Oliver Evans 
to His Counsel, supra note 20 (writing to his counsel to aid them in defense 
of his patent rights). 
213. Federico, supra note 94, at 681; Ferguson, supra note 11, at 53. 
214. Deposition of Joseph Evans, Evans v. Masier, (C.C.S.D.N.Y. October 1816), 
on file at Law Case Files 1790–1846, National Archives at New York City. 
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counties in search of unlicensed users of Evans’s machinery, ultimately 
demanding licenses from twenty-four millers in amounts ranging from 
$50 to $1,350.215 By then, Joseph was one of at least seven regional 
agents operating in the mid-Atlantic states.216 Yet the larger the effort 
to secure licenses, the more resistance Oliver Evans encountered. By 
1817, he employed “fifteen of the most eminent counsel” to conduct 
litigation and found his own time “wholly engrossed by law suits.”217 
The total number of suits filed by Evans in the 1810s is unknown, 
stashed away in the dockets and files of individual federal courts.218 A 
few visible parts of the campaign suggest litigation on a large scale: 
indices of court archives show more than 200 suits filed in Virginia 
between 1811 and 1823;219 more than thirty in Philadelphia;220 and 
another twenty-nine in the Southern District of New York,221 to name 
but a few of the jurisdictions in which Evans was active. Repeat 
litigation against hundreds of individual defendants was a feature of the 
nineteenth-century patent system.222 But the practice did not generally 
emerge until the 1830s;223 Evans anticipated this development by 
decades. 
An enforcement campaign of this scale required organization. 
Unlike in steam engineering, where he both patented his inventions and 
established a leading manufacturing works,224 Evans was always a “non-
practicing” patentee when it came to the milling patent. His network 
of agents had a dual mandate to enforce his patent and to promote 
(though not construct) his technology, demanding licenses where they 
 
215. Id. 
216. See Letter from Oliver Evans to the Millers of the United States (Dec. 30, 
1809), https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.1510150b/?sp=1 [https://perma 
.cc/4RHP-7EC9] (naming regional agents). 
217. Evans, Oliver Evans to His Counsel, supra note 20, at 46. 
218. These sources could be consulted in normal times, but at the time of 
writing are inaccessible due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
219. 7 The Papers of John Marshall: April 1807–December 1813, at 404 
(Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1993) (citing U.S. Circuit Court for Virginia, 
Index to Ended Cases 1790–1860). 
220. See National Archives, Law and Appellate Records of the U.S. Circuit Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1790–1847, Microfilm Publication 
M969 (listing filed suits by plaintiff). 
221. Database of patent suits filed in the U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern 
District of New York, on file with author. 
222. See Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 
Yale L.J. 848, 848 (2016). 
223. Id. at 860–62 (describing the emergence of litigation campaigns in the 
1830s and 1840s). 
224. See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 139. 
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found his system in operation and encouraging its adoption where it 
was not already used.225 The enforcement effort was centrally managed 
but locally entrepreneurial: Evans financed and oversaw litigation, 
while his agents worked for a commission based on the value of licenses 
and interest.226 Lawsuits were a calculated cost of the business model. 
In an 1817 letter ordering substantial payments to his counsel in 
Philadelphia and NYC for litigation-related expenses, Evans explained 
that “we must continue to risk 100$ to recover $10,000.”227 Some cases 
resulted in substantial damages: Evans reported one case where demand 
for a $40 license ended with recovered damages of $2,148.228 But the 
principal objective of suing was to bring recalcitrant millers into line 
and secure their acquiescence in licensing.229 
The growing organization of Evans’s enforcement effort contrasted 
with the underdeveloped state of the patent law itself. Supreme Court 
Justice Joseph Story found the law wholly “vague and unsettled” when 
he first took the bench in 1811,230 and the nascent patent jurisprudence 
that emerged over the next decade consisted mostly of his own reported 
decisions on circuit in Massachusetts and others from Justice Bushrod 
Washington in Pennsylvania.231 The Supreme Court decided its first 
patent case in 1810, a dispute about an assignee’s right to sue.232 The 
next four cases decided at the high court were Evans v. Jordan233 in 
 
225. Deposition of Joseph Evans, supra note 214. 
226. See, e.g., Letter from John Moody to Thomas Jefferson (October 20, 1808) 
(on file with the National Archives), https://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-8907 [https://perma.cc/JD93-HD7X] (off–
ering a license and explaining his commission as an employee of Oliver 
Evans). 
227. Letter from Oliver Evans to David Muhlenberg (December 20, 1817), 
reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 259 (noting payments of 
$200 and $1,000 to Evans’s attorneys). 
228. Letter from Oliver Evans to Daniel Woods (April 5, 1817), reprinted in 
Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 243. 
229. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph Evans to Oliver Evans (April 8, 1816), 
reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 231 (approving selection of a 
particular litigation target on the grounds that “if you will defeat him, the 
whole state will pay you”).  
230. Joseph Story, 1 Life and Letters of Joseph Story 237 (William W. 
Story ed., Boston, Little & Brown 1851). 
231. See Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 359 (noting that the two justices 
were among the first to have their circuit opinions reported and together 
accounted for forty out of the fifty-eight cases reported or referenced from 
the circuits before 1835). 
232. Tyler v. Tuel, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 324 (1810). 
233. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815). 
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1815, Evans v. Eaton234 in 1818, Evans v. Eaton235 again in 1822, and 
Evans v. Hettich236 in the same year. It is perhaps not surprising that 
Evans’s cases reached the Supreme Court when other patents did not. 
No other patent of the time equaled the milling patent’s combination 
of large financial stakes and widespread enforcement. But it meant that 
Evans’s rights arrived at the Court with every issue they presented 
being a matter of first impression for that body. 
B. Oliver Evans and the Principles of Patent Law 
The first Supreme Court case dealt with an issue peculiar to Evans. 
The appeal of Evans v. Jordan, Chief Justice Marshall’s decision on 
circuit upholding Evans’s rights against infringers who erected their 
mills before the congressional renewal,237 came before the whole Court 
in 1815. In a brief disposition, the unanimous Court affirmed Marshall’s 
conclusion as a matter of statutory construction, finding the act “free 
from all ambiguity” in protecting only activity prior to the date of the 
renewal.238 For our purposes, the most salient aspect of the decision may 
be what it did not say: Justice Bushrod Washington’s opinion made no 
mention of Marshall’s “inchoate right” language; in fact it employed 
none of the language of property, natural rights, or public right that 
had occupied Evans or his adversaries below.239 The decision set a tone 
that others would follow: the Supreme Court’s Evans cases did not 
engage in deep musing about the nature of the patent right, but instead 
focused on the practical implementation of the law. 
Practical questions were fundamental, though. For example, the 
Evans cases forced the Court to consider what made an invention 
“new”—or more precisely, what qualified as prior art that would inval–
idate a patent. This was a question that the everyday administration 
of the 1793 Patent Act did not answer, since the statute allowed any 
applicant to receive a patent with no prior examination for novelty.240 
The Act left it for litigation to invalidate a patent for an invention that 
was “originally” discovered, used, or described before the patentee’s 
invention.241 American courts only began to define these terms in a 
 
234. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818). 
235. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822). 
236. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 453 (1822). 
237. See supra notes 159–1170 and accompanying text. 
238. Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. at 202. 
239. The defendants did argue these points to the Court. See id. at 201. 
240. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21 (requiring no inves–
tigation before the Secretary of State could issue a patent). 
241. Id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 322 (invalidity where the invention “was not originally 
discovered by the patentee, but had been in use, or had been described in 
some public work anterior to the supposed discovery”); id. § 10, at 323 
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systematic way in the 1810s.242 Evans’s patent presented a rich 
environment for doing so, thanks to his opponents mounting a lengthy 
effort to find machines that purportedly anticipated the components of 
his system,243 and Evans resisting on the grounds that those machines 
were obscure, ineffective, or abandoned. 
The Supreme Court generally resolved these questions of novelty in 
ways we would find familiar now, holding that if earlier uses of Evans’s 
technology were proved, they would invalidate his patent. But that 
does not mean the Court’s conclusions were uncontestable at the time. 
Among other arguments that would seem off-the-wall today, Evans’s 
attorneys contended that a prior use could not invalidate a patent when 
the inventor was unaware of it.244 Pushing back still further against 
obscure prior art, they argued that prior use of an invention could not 
invalidate a patent unless the older machine was useful enough to 
receive a patent of its own.245 For good measure, they argued that that 
challenges to the validity of Evans’s patent were statutorily foreclosed 
by both the Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans246 and by the Patent 
Act’s hazily understood provision for suits to repeal an invalid grant, 
which limited affirmative challenges to the first three years of a patent’s 
life.247 None of these contentions prevailed, but Evans’s assertions about 
prior art were not necessarily challenging well-settled U.S. law. Other 
litigants at the time similarly argued that prior use would only 
 
(permitting an action to repeal the patent where “the patentee was not the 
true inventor or discoverer”). 
242. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 514 (1818) (determining 
that the words “originally discovered” make void any subsequent patent, 
even if the patentee had no knowledge of the prior discovery). 
243. See id. at 472–73; Memorial to Congress of Sundry Citizens Praying Relief 
from the Oppressive Operation of Oliver Evans’ Patent, supra note 186, 
at 1–2. 
244. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 850 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4,559) 
(reporting counsel’s distinction between a “first” discovery and an “original” 
discovery under which “[i]t is not necessary that the plaintiff should be the 
first discoverer, if he was a real bona fide discoverer, without knowing that 
a similar discovery had previously been made”). Evans’s lawyers later 
retreated from this position, claiming they meant only that prior use did 
not count if it was private or secret. See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. at 502. 
245. See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. at 487–88 (reporting counsel’s argument that 
“[t]he useful thing patented prevails over one, not useful nor patented, 
though in previous partial existence”). 
246. See id. at 486 (reporting counsel’s claim that “[t]he special act is an absolute 
grant to him, binding on all the community, and precluding any inquiry 
into the originality of the invention”). 
247. See Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 855 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4,559); see 
also Beauchamp, supra note 10, at 674 (noting confusion over the meaning 
of the repeal provision). 
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anticipate a later patent if it were widely known or adopted.248 Only 
with Justice Story’s influential decision to the contrary in Bedford v. 
Hunt249 (1817) and Justice Washington’s jury charge in the 1816 trial 
of Evans v. Eaton250 was this idea officially rebuffed in the circuit courts. 
The Supreme Court’s first decision in Evans v. Eaton confirmed that 
even where “the patentee had no knowledge of this previous use or 
previous description; still his patent is void.”251 
The greatest doctrinal legacy of the Evans cases came in the law of 
patent claiming. Numerous commentators have seen Evans v. Eaton 
(1822) as a foundational moment for the emergence of the claim as a 
defining feature of the patent.252 The requirement that a patentee 
should include one or more explicit claims identifying the protected 
invention did not enter the statute until 1836,253 but it followed judicial 
developments among which Evans v. Eaton was central. 
Again, the special circumstances of Evans’s grant pushed the courts 
to grapple with the indeterminacies of the law. As issued in 1808, the 
Evans patent included a kind of claim, but not in any format that one 
would recognize today.254 The specification identified two “principles”—
one for powering the milling process from the motive power of the mill 
 
248. See, e.g., Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 38 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217) 
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“particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, 
which he claims as his own invention or discovery”). 
254. The original patent is lost, but a copy of the text appears in the report of 
Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. at 461–71. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Oliver Evans and the Framing of American Patent Law 
488 
rather than manually, and the other for keeping the meal in constant 
motion as it was ground, bolted, and dried—and claimed “[t]he 
application of those principles . . . as my invention.”255 The patent then 
listed a numbered series of machines for carrying them out: the elevator, 
conveyer, hopperboy, drill, and kiln-drier.256 Of the hopperboy, Evans 
added that he claimed “as my invention, the peculiar properties or 
principles which this machine possesses.”257 The patent’s distinction 
between principle and application tracked the language of the 1793 
Patent Act, which instructed a patentee to “fully explain the principle 
[of his machine], and the several modes in which he has contemplated 
the application of that principle.”258 But the statute gave courts little 
instruction on how to translate the patentee’s descriptions into the 
scope of the right. 
The alleged infringement in Evans v. Eaton turned not on the use 
of Evans’s system as a whole, but on the use of just one machine, the 
hopperboy. At trial in the circuit court, Justice Washington saw no 
infringement, holding that the patent covered the complete system, not 
its individual components.259 The Supreme Court reversed, with Chief 
Justice Marshall apparently torn over the question, but concluding that 
the act of Congress restoring Evans’s rights was meant to protect all of 
the inventor’s machines separately.260 
On remand, the scope of Evans’s rights once again proved 
problematic, but now as a matter of validity. If the hopperboy were a 
protected invention in its own right, Washington reasoned, then Evans 
had to explain the difference between his “improved” hopperboy and 
the relevant prior art: in this instance a form of mechanical hopperboy 
allegedly operated by one Christian Stouffer and his family in the 1770s 
and early 1780s.261 The lack of any distinguishing claim was fatal. 
Evans’s “patent for an improvement is void,” Washington instructed 
 
255. Id. at 464–65. 
256. Id. at 465–69. 
257. Id. at 468. 
258. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321–22. 
259. Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 854 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4,559) (charging 
jury as follows: “But is the exclusive right to the hopperboy granted by this 
patent? It certainly is not, although this machine constitutes a part of the 
improvement of which the plaintiff was the original discoverer, and it is for 
that improvement, and that only, for which the grant is made.”). 
260. Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. at 506–07. Marshall wrote apologetically to 
Washington that he and his colleagues believed the Evans act to authorize 
“a much greater latitude than is authorized by the general patent law.” 
Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (Oct. 28, 1818), 
reprinted in 8 The Papers of John Marshall: March 1814–December 
1819, at 200 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 2014). 
261. Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 856, 857–60 (C.C.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 4,560). 
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the jury, “because the nature and extent of his improvement are not 
stated in his specification.”262 
On this point Washington was working hand in glove with the 
leading American authority on patents, Justice Joseph Story. Story had 
recently announced on circuit that a patent that “mixes up the old and 
the new, and does not distinctly ascertain for which, in particular, the 
patent is claimed . . . must be void.”263 If such a patent meant to include 
the old, he argued, it was invalid for claiming more broadly than the 
invention; if it did not, it was invalid for failing to inform the court and 
the public of its scope.264 Story then took the opportunity of Evans v. 
Eaton, as the first case of patent validity to reach the Supreme Court, 
to write a “Note on the Patent Laws,” which appeared as an appendix 
to the case in the official Reports.265 The Note stressed this same point 
repeatedly and in stern italics.266 
Evans v. Eaton’s second visit to the Supreme Court, in 1822, 
established the doctrine for the Court as a whole. Justice Story’s 
opinion confirmed that an act of distinguishing the invention from the 
prior art was “indispensable,”267 both to enable scrutiny of the patent’s 
novelty and to give notice to the public of its scope.268 The decision 
delivered the coup de grace to Evans’s patent, which was “defective in 
not specifying that improvement.”269 
Evans v. Eaton was not the origin of the patent law’s distinct 
claiming requirement,270 just the moment when it acquired the 
imprimatur of the Supreme Court. It would be wrong, though, to think 
that the case merely ratified conventional wisdom. The 1822 decision 
was neither inevitable nor a product of consensus on the Court. In an 
 
262. Id. at 859. 
263. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1020 (C.C.D. Ma. 1817) (No. 8,568); see 
also Lutz, supra note 252, at 138–39 (describing earlier rulings by Story to 
similar effect). 
264. Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1020. 
265. See Joseph Story, Note on the Patent Laws, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) app. 13, at 
27 (1818) (referring to Eaton as “the principal case in the text” to which 
the Note was attached). 
266. See id. at 25, 27 (reiterating that “if the invention is definitively described 
in the patent and specification, so as to distinguish it from other inventions 
before known, the patent is good”). 
267. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434–35 (1822). 
268. Id. at 434. 
269. Id. at 435. 
270. See, e.g., Story, supra note 265, at 21–22, 27 (citing Story’s earlier decisions 
and English antecedents). 
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era of relatively few dissents, the case split the justices 4–3.271 Justice 
Livingston’s dissent lamented that Story’s decision would have “a very 
extensive, if not a disastrous bearing on many other patents for 
improvements, and will in fact amount to a repeal of many of them.”272 
To invalidate “a patent for a highly useful improvement” like Evans’s 
was “a very high penalty, and should not be lightly inflicted, unless 
rendered absolutely necessary by law.”273 
Behind the dissenters’ concern for the reliance interests of existing 
patentees lay a larger dispute over sources of authority in American 
patent law. Story’s impulse in his early patent law writings (and in his 
jurisprudence generally) was to draw on English law.274 The approach 
that he and Washington took of the patent specification rested on their 
view of the English cases.275 By contrast, the dissenters in Evans v. 
Eaton urged their brethren to be “extremely cautious in adopting the 
rules which have been introduced into other countries, and under laws 
not in every respect like our own.”276 The English cases “which . . . seem 
to have been implicitly followed in this country” almost all post-dated 
the Revolution, were mostly subsequent to the American patent acts, 
and were “made on a British act of Parliament very unlike our own.”277 
In particular, English decisions invalidating patents for defective 
specifications were “not of authority.”278 The back-and-forth struggle 
over Story’s anglicizing patent law was a recurring theme of the 1820s, 
with the question of how strict American law should be in invalidating 
patents being constantly unsettled as a result.279 
Oliver Evans did not live to see his patent felled in 1822 by the 
rising strain of English strictness in patent doctrine. He had died in 
1819, his health declining rapidly after fire gutted his prized engineering 
 
271. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. at 435, 452. 
272. Id. at 436 (Livingston, J. dissenting). 
273. Id. at 448. 
274. See R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: 
Statesman of the Old Republic 139–40 (1985); Frank D. Prager, The 
Changing Views of Justice Story on the Construction of Patents, 4 Am. J. 
Legal Hist. 1, 10–11 (1960). 
275. See Story, supra note 265, at 21–23; Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 856, 860 
(C.C.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 4,560). 
276. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. at 439 (Livingston, J. dissenting). 
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279. See, e.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 6, 9, 18 (1829) (arguments 
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precedent); McGaw v. Bryan, 16 F. Cas. 96, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1821) (No. 8,793) 
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works—one last consignment of his inventions to the flames.280 Yet the 
inventor made an appearance in his last case. Counsel for the patentee, 
attempting to tack away from the problem of defining an “improve–
ment” patent, worked instead to compare Evans to the archetypal great 
inventors of the day, men whose patents had likewise been central to 
their personal mythologies. “Upon what ground, then, can it be said 
that he is not an original inventor, when [James] Watt was solemnly 
adjudged, and [Robert] Fulton unanimously allowed to be so?”281 
Brilliant, frustrated, querulous, and prideful as he was, Oliver Evans 
himself could not have asked the question any better. 
Conclusion 
The life of Oliver Evans encompassed all the highs and lows of the 
patent system in the early Republic. From these events, one can—and 
Evans did—tell a story of weak patents, in which widespread piracy, 
public indifference, and legal uncertainty combined to leave the 
patentee helpless and frustrated. At the same time, Evans’s career 
included legislative support from both states and the national govern–
ment, federal courts that enforced his rights in hundreds of suits across 
multiple jurisdictions, and a model of patent assertion that enabled the 
inventor to specialize and invest in further invention and innovation. 
Whether the early U.S. patent system delivered consistently on its 
promises of protection is a subject for another day. For now, suffice to 
say that Evans experienced all the contradictions of early American 
patent law. 
First, more than any other inventor, he participated in the full 
variety of patent systems in the new United States, above all by 
traversing both the state and federal patent regimes. Yet his experience 
suggests more continuity across the great 1790 divide than is generally 
recognized. With their common basis in the practice of petitioning for 
government assistance, state legislative grants were more bureaucratic 
and early federal patents more irregular than one might expect. When 
we seek to reconstruct the conceptual world of the early patent system, 
the creation of a general national patent statute may not have been the 
sharp break that is often assumed. 
Second, Evans’s role as a polemicist reveals underappreciated 
nuance in the discourse of patent rights. Although Evans was both the 
leading campaigner for stronger patent rights in the early Republic and 
the leading advocate of a natural-property conception of the patent, the 
debates around his rights do not easily reduce to the “privilege versus 
property” framework of recent years. The early nineteenth century had 
a greater range of frames for discussing patents and patentees, including 
not only arguments based on utility and property but also those 
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founded on compensation and relief. And the supposedly foundational 
statements of patent philosophy that appeared around Evans’s rights, 
such as Marshall’s decision in Evans v. Jordan and Jefferson’s denial 
that patent rights arose from a natural property right, are on closer 
inspection revealed to be less clear cut than modern commentators 
assume. 
Third, Evans, the man most aggrieved by the decisions of the early 
federal courts in patent matters, was also a major spur to their work. 
The volume and controversy of his litigation, the confusing construction 
of his patent document, and the unusual context of his legislative 
extension all forced judges to work out—and gave them the opportunity 
to declare—what would later become basic principles of American 
patent law. That Evans died disgusted with their decisions even before 
the Supreme Court finally invalidated his patent in 1822 is a good 
reminder to be careful what you ask for. 
 
